Lt. Col. Jeff Cooper coined the phrase “Preoccupation with Inconsequential Increments” (PII) to describe the human tendency to obsess over tiny, measurable differences in equipment or performance that have no meaningful impact on real-world results. He defined an “inconsequential increment” as a difference that has no significant relationship to the purpose of the exercise.

“Years ago we coined the appellation, ‘Preoccupation with Inconsequential Increments,’ or PII. This peculiarity lies in attributing importance to measurable deviations so small as to be meaningless. You see it in the people who shoot test groups in rifles, awarding a prize to a group which is only thousandths of an inch smaller than those unrewarded. One sees it in speed records awarded in one-thousandths of one mile-per-hour. One sees it in basketball scores which, nearing the century mark, are separated by less than three points. In all such cases Score A is ‘better’ than Score B, but who cares?

“An increment may be termed inconsequential when it has no significant relationship to the purpose of the exercise. Of course, if the purpose of the exercise is in itself inconsequential, some may not think this to be foolish. A very distinguished general at Quantico once caused the sign to be placed over the exit door of every office asking, in brilliant scarlet and gold, ‘What are you trying to do?’ There was a man who knew more about human nature than most.”

While Cooper was certainly correct, this ignores a much bigger problem: What about Ignorance of Nonexistent Increments?

Some people in the tactical community obsess over the “problem” of other shooters, particularly those in the competition realm, being overly obsessed with performance. You’ve heard the excuses:

“There aren’t score zones or stopwatches in real life.”

“Don’t play timer games or circus tricks.”

“Hoping more people wake up from the distraction that timer drills and qual courses often become.”

Andy Stanford recently released his new book, Gunfighter U, Mastering the American Martial Art, where he opines:

“To get a Grandmaster card or win a major match requires many esoteric skills that have nothing to do with gunfighting.”

Mr. Stanford summed up his advice for new martial-minded gun owners starting out on how to avoid PII:

“Shoot at least twelve matches total, not more than one a week, no fewer than one a month. If you wish, shoot until you reach a B Classification in USPSA, or Expert in IDPA. Then throttle back to one or two matches a year at most. At this point, spend your spare time learning tactical medicine or applied combatives. Or conversing with your significant other. Or playing with your kids.”

Many in the tactical community express concerns about preoccupation with range results, warning against Preoccupation with Inconsequential Increments as if it were some existential threat.

A preoccupation with PII is itself a preoccupation with inconsequential increments. Far worse than PII is Ignorance of Nonexistant Increments.

I’m not worried about top competition shooters; there aren’t enough of them to worry about, which should be a concern for different reasons. I’m much more concerned with the many MILLIONS of military, law enforcement, and individual gun owners that never reach useful levels of skill. They’re not nearly as good with firearms as they should be, and are usually unaware of it: they have Ignorance of Nonexistant Increments concerning their lack of skill.

The U.S. military has about 2.1 million uniformed personnel in all branches, active and reserve. Add to this about 750,000 sworn law enforcement; that’s about 2,850,000 armed uniformed personnel in the public sector. Over 60 million Americans state they own a firearm for protection, something that about 70% of Americans state is at least one reason why they own at least one gun.

Various competitive action or practical shooting disciplines are relevant here and draw the most attention. The most popular of these competition shooting formats with national-level organizations tops out with a few ten thousand members. USPSA lists about 37,000 members, IDPA 25,000, PCSL 4,500; any other groups are smaller. If we add these together, ignore the overlap among people who are members of more than one group, include participants who aren’t card-carrying members, and then generously round up, we might have about 100,000 total.

Tactical PII

Even if every competitor was also military or sworn law enforcement (they’re obviously not), that means 96.5% are NOT participating in any capacity or at any level. Taking the better assessment that 60 million Americans owning a defensive firearm also includes military and police, that’s a 0.165% particiation rate - 99.835% of military, police, and civilian gun owners that already have a firearm suitable to participate in these events, don’t.

This already indicates that 624 out of 625 gun owners have never participated in a match.

Of those that have, most of the actual participants are far from a “Preoccupation with Inconsequential Increments.” According to data published by the International Defensive Pistol Association, their most popular Stock Service Pistol division has less than 12% of their membership Classified as Expert, and only 4% earned Master.

Contrast this to formal testing of civilian and military law enforcement showing most of them are incapable of being competitive in the LOWEST skill bracket. Article and videos with citations:

Link to article with citations:

In USPSA, about 65% of current classified shooters are D or C class, and about 25% are B class.

Using Stanford’s stratification, at least two-thirds of current participants would be well served to push for an INCREASE in scores; less than a quarter (15-25%) are at a skill level he recommends as beneficial but not excessive.

That means only 5-10% of current participants have pushed into a level Stanford considers higher than useful, allegedly due to their Preoccupation with Inconsequential Increments. That’s 5-10% of 0.165%.

Ten percent of 100,000 participants is 10,000; about 0.016% of the 60 million total, or less than 1 in 6,000.

For every 6,000 people with defensive firearms, one of them MIGHT be pursuing shooting skills beyond a reasonable level. The other 5,999 would be well served to shoot matches and work to improve their scores.

People who are expressing concern over that one person in 6,000 clearly have a Preoccupation with Inconsequential Increments.

In October 1904, New York Times reported that, with the approval of Congress, the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice began distributing surplus Krag carbines to schools and rifle clubs across the United States. It also distributed millions of dollars for the construction and operation of rifle ranges and similar facilities.

The board, authorized by Congress, had the mission of devising “ways and means ... by which the interests of the general public in rifle practice might be stimulated.”

At the turn of the century, there was a great fear among some Americans that with the “closure of the frontier” and the accelerating industrialization and urbanization of the United States, the country was losing some of the essence that made it American. Part of this was a perceived decline in marksmanship and familiarity with weapons, as Americans moved from the country to the city.

As the United States did not have a significant permanent standing army until the Korean War (except for temporary increases during the world wars), it was believed that civilian marksmanship skills were critical to deploying an effective volunteer military if war broke out.

As the October 1904 New York Times story linked above points out:

“The Krag carbines soon will be discarded by the cavalry arm of the regular establishment, and the National Board will seek to obtain possession of them for distribution to the military schools ... It is also proposed that one carbine for each twenty-five scholars should be issued to public schools possessing indoor ranges and carrying on rifle practice. When the new Springfield rifle is issued to the regular establishment about 100,000 Krags will be available for distribution.”

The story quotes Assistant Secretary of War Robert Shaw Oliver: “Our permanent military establishment or regular army must be small ... and in the event of a war with one or more of the first-class powers of the world we must depend largely upon the militia and the volunteers for our fighting force. With the modern long-range small arm it is all-important that the soldier should know how to shoot, and to hit what he shoots at.”

Further, Theodore Roosevelt stated in 1904: “As a nation we must depend upon our volunteer soldiers in time of trial. . . . Of course, a soldier who cannot shoot is a soldier who counts for very little in battle, and all credit is due to those who keep up the standard of marksmanship.”

Later, the Chairman of War Manpower Commission during World War 2 stated: “Our men must be trained to make the best use of the superior weapons with which they are armed,” and said that the National Rifle Association’s program “means more straight shooting and makes for victory.”

This was supported by numerous U.S. Presidents who also participated:

The National Board, which included members of the National Rifle Association, developed into the Civilian Marksmanship Program (again administered in conjunction with the NRA). That program distributed thousands of weapons, tons of ammunition, and extensive lessons across the country. Between 1959 and 1964 alone, the Army sold 539,267 surplus rifles and other firearms to members of the NRA and other civilians at large discounts.

John F. Kennedy also supported this, saying, “Through competitive matches and sports in coordination with the [NBPRP], the [National Rifle] Association fills an important role in our national defense effort, and fosters in an active and meaningful fashion the spirit of the Minutemen.”

In 1966, Harlon Carter, president of the National Rifle Association, declared to the Times that “in Vietnam, a soldier with prior marksmanship training as a civilian stands a better chance of survival in combat, is a more efficient marksman and has more confidence in his ability to use his rifle effectively in action.”

But in the late 1960s, with concerns about urban riots among the young rising, there was fear in Congress that weapons and ammunition from the Civilian Marksmanship Program were making their way onto the black market and arming rioters. There was also fear among some Democrats, such as Rep. Henry Gonzalez, D-Texas, that the Civilian Marksmanship Program was deliberately arming right-wing militias. Gonzalez’s target was the Minutemen, a right-wing militia organized and trained to defend against a communist takeover of the United States.

The Arthur D. Little Report of 1979 analyzed data from over 12,880 Army trainees at four Army Training Centers, and found that trainees who had previous experience with firearms in civilian life are generally better marksmen, are more likely to use their weapon effectively in combat, and are less likely to be wounded or killed in combat. [...] While only 15.4% of trainees overall achieved “Expert” marksmanship scores (the highest possible category), 68.6% of trainees who were members of a DCM-affiliated civilian shooting club achieved an “Expert” score. The report therefore concluded that, “[t]he marksmanship instruction, supervised practice, safety training, and competitions . . . sponsored and supported by clubs, the NRA, and the DCM are of particular value to the military.”

Despite this, the Civilian Marksmanship Program fell out of favor and took on diminished importance through the late 1970s and 1980s, particularly in light of America’s strong antimilitarist attitudes following the Vietnam War. In the 1990s, there was a movement to divest the program from the government, and in 1996 Congress passed a law creating the nonprofit Corporation for the Promotion of Rifle Practice and Firearms Safety Inc.

The Civilian Marksmanship Program continues to operate today under that nonprofit, operating competitions and surplus sales (they’re frequently sold out) to this day.

Current Supreme Court Interpretation

From District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008):

Starting with a summary:

The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home. Pp. 2–53.

(a) The Amendment’s prefatory clause announces a purpose, but does not limit or expand the scope of the second part, the operative clause. The operative clause’s text and history demonstrate that it connotes an individual right to keep and bear arms. Pp. 2–22

(b) The prefatory clause comports with the Court’s interpretation of the operative clause. The “militia” comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. The Antifederalists feared that the Federal Government would disarm the people in order to disable this citizens’ militia, enabling a politicized standing army or a select militia to rule. The response was to deny Congress power to abridge the ancient right of individuals to keep and bear arms, so that the ideal of a citizens’ militia would be preserved. Pp. 22–28.

The longer version:

a. “Well-Regulated Militia.” In United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, 179 (1939), we explained that “the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense.” That definition comports with founding-era sources. See, e.g., Webster (“The militia of a country are the able bodied men organized into com­panies, regiments and brigades . . . and required by law to attend military exercises on certain days only, but at other times left to pursue their usual occupations”); The Feder­alist No. 46, pp. 329, 334 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison) (“near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands”); Letter to Destutt de Tracy (Jan. 26, 1811), in The Portable Thomas Jefferson 520, 524 (M. Peterson ed. 1975) (“[T]he militia of the State, that is to say, of every man in it able to bear arms”).

Petitioners take a seemingly narrower view of the mili­tia, stating that “[m]ilitias are the state- and congression­ally-regulated military forces described in the Militia Clauses (art. I, §8, cls. 15–16).” Brief for Petitioners 12. Although we agree with petitioners’ interpretive assump­tion that “militia” means the same thing in Article I and the Second Amendment, we believe that petitioners iden­tify the wrong thing, namely, the organized militia. Unlike armies and navies, which Congress is given the power to create (“to raise . . . Armies”; “to provide . . . a Navy,” Art. I, §8, cls. 12–13), the militia is assumed by Article I already to be in existence. Congress is given the power to “provide for calling forth the militia,” §8, cl. 15; and the power not to create, but to “organiz[e]” it—and not to organize “a” militia, which is what one would expect if the militia were to be a federal creation, but to organize “the” militia, connoting a body already in existence, ibid., cl. 16. This is fully consistent with the ordinary definition of the militia as all able-bodied men. From that pool, Congress has plenary power to organize the units that will make up an effective fighting force. That is what Con­gress did in the first militia Act, which specified that “each and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the re­spective states, resident therein, who is or shall be of the age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years (except as is herein after excepted) shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the militia.” Act of May 8, 1792, 1 Stat. 271. To be sure, Congress need not conscript every able-bodied man into the militia, because nothing in Article I suggests that in exercising its power to organize, discipline, and arm the militia, Congress must focus upon the entire body. Although the militia consists of all able bodied men, the federally organized militia may consist of a subset of them.

Finally, the adjective “well-regulated” implies nothing more than the imposition of proper discipline and training. See Johnson 1619 (“Regulate”: “To adjust by rule or method”); Rawle 121–122; cf. Va. Declaration of Rights §13 (1776), in 7 Thorpe 3812, 3814 (referring to “a wellregulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms”).

For more details on current Federal law and formal declarations by Congress:

More citations:
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/02/07-290_amicus_retiredmilitary.pdf

Before we do that, if one simply learns to shoot better, they might become a “Mega Corporate Sponsored Shooter.” Some tips:

Shooters that don’t win are simply outclassed. A superior shooter won, and a sponsorship had nothing to do with it.

Rob Leatham won his first IPSC Nationals in 1983 (this was before USPSA existed), after which he was the IPSC World Champion three times. Then and only then did he receive a major sponsorship. Leatham’s sponsorship was basically Springfield Armory employing him as a member of R&D and marketing.

Most “pro shooter” sponsorships only involve receiving some products and offsetting some of the costs of training and competing, or it involves being employed by a company that is agreeable and flexible to participation in competitive shooting. Any such sponsorship only came after they had regularly earned success on their own. Even then, almost every “professional” shooter still has a regular job (just like you!) or is earning an income via sales or other business efforts.

Being a pro shooter isn’t a thing:

“Must be nice!” whines the complainer. “I could be a champ too if someone gave me stuff.” No, probably not. How often does said complainer win local club matches? Are they even competitive with local shooters Classified at the Master level or higher? These are wins within the grasp of every gun owner willing to dry practice diligently and regularly.

Some shooters are quick to complain about sponsored shooters winning and stealing “their” matches and prizes. Meanwhile, mass media crams basketball, baseball, and football down our throats. Where are the complaints about these guys? Consider how expensive tickets are even in the cheap seats. You have no chance of winning anything; you don't even get a chance to play. Try walking on the field and announcing to the players and referee that you want to play next. Remind them that you paid good money to be there and you deserve a chance. Then security kicks you out.

Or, you could instead attend a state-level or higher shooting match, likely for less cost, and have an honest chance to win. At least they’ll let you on the field to try.

The SO/RO/referees are not biased to sponsored shooters; they just put up higher scores. If that bothers you, finish reading this and then dry practice for at least half an hour, then exercise for at least as long. From now on, do this every day. Commit to a live fire practice schedule, ensuring dry practice of at least 50 dry repetitions for every single live round fired. Record your results in a journal and track that your measurements prove your skills and scores are steadily increasing. Repeat this sequence for the next five to ten years, and you’ll likely be able to keep up with and possibly earn a “Mega Corporate Sponsorship” yourself!

Skills can only be earned through trial, effort, and motivation. There is no secret technique, and the information is out there. The “only” thing you have to do is consistently practice it.

Robert M. Layng is a Machinist/Technician for the Engineering Division at Lafayette College in Easton, Pennsylvania. He has been in machine shops since his high school vocational school years. A 2008 graduate of the Toolmaking Technology program at Pennsylvania College of Technology in Williamsport, he specializes in prototyping and practical design. Robert has been a contributing author for American Gunsmith magazine.

Robert also hosts the new weekly podcast, “The Daily Grind” by Cutting Tool Engineering Magazine, live Monday mornings at 8 am Eastern, uploaded to major streaming platforms on Tuesday morning. He also contributes regularly to the magazine. The Daily Grind podcast can be found at CTE’s website, YouTube, Spotify, and Apple Podcasts:

https://engineering.lafayette.edu/rob-layng-to-host-new-daily-grind-podcast-for-cutting-tool-engineering
Cutting Tool Engineering Magazine:
“The Daily Grind” by Cutting Tool Engineering Magazine with Robert M. Layng
YouTube:
https://www.youtube.com/@CuttingToolEngineering/podcasts
Spotify:
CTE “The Daily Grind” with Robert M. Layng
Apple Podcast:
The Daily Grind

He enjoys hearing feedback from his audiences, and can be reached at layngr@gmail.com and https://www.linkedin.com/in/rob-layng-604031391

Speed (Re)Loading: Shotgun

Being not completely satisfied with my last two designs, I hit the drawing board again to come up with the more optimum solution for quicker reloads in a break action shotgun.

by R. M. Layng

In previous articles I wrote about my iterations of a speed loader for break action shotguns (August and December 2023). It was designed around my specific shotgun as a split clamp or clam shell design. I took much inspiration from the speed loaders used for revolvers and have gone through many reams of graph paper to come up with the design that I wrote about. This latest iteration is no different. I put a set of five completed clam shell loaders to a rigorous test at a recent round of Sporting Clays and have found the flaws in the design. The biggest one was the physical size of the loaders didn’t fit into the open action very well. There was plenty of room for the shells to line up and start into the chambers and cycling the splitter freely dropped the hulls into their chambers, but it had to be done at an inconvenient position in relation to the open receiver. I couldn’t just rest the assembly on the breech and trip the splitter like I originally intended, so I’d have to hover over the breech and shake the loader a little bit to get the hulls to wiggle into their chambers.

This latest version is a stark departure from the last generation, and there is a lot of hope that this is an improvement worth the time and material investments. This generation employs some spring-loaded plungers that protrude from the inside of the shell holder. The spring-loaded plunger system came from my father, Robert A. Layng, and is a close replication of his system for the ejector pins used in his molds to help separate finished product from the mold cavities. Some slight changes were made to his design to make the pins more resilient, but otherwise the system is unchanged. Many thanks to him for lending me the design for this new system. This subsystem employs a machined captive pin that passes through a hole in the bottom of the holder and a larger diameter head that traps the pin inside of the hole so it can’t fall out and provides a surface for the spring to press against. Then there is a spring applying pressure from behind, and both pieces are captured by a set screw which is applying a pre-load to the spring.

The way this is intended to work is that when you press shells into the holder, the spring-loaded pins will collapse up into the holder but still apply slight pressure to the brass of the shell to keep it in place. Slide one shotshell all the way to the back of the loader and then add another one in line so that you can drop the assembly into the open breech, grab the loader, and slide it off to the side or forward, depending if your blaster is over/under or side by side. I had originally tried to cut down excess parts and wanted to use two spring-loaded pegs instead of four, but I immediately realized that it would put the peg directly inline with, and potentially pressing against, the primer of the shells. This could result in dangerous unintended discharges, so that idea was scrapped for the four-peg idea that I have laid out in these pages.

Now, onto how I made them. I decided to go with a monolithic design this time and would need to incorporate both the shell clamp and shell port in one piece to remain as compact as possible while still having it do everything I required of it. This is when I reached out to my father to ask if I could use his method of the ejection pins but with a few small changes. I decided I would make the part long enough to hold two shells in place with a small amount of room for adjustment to accommodate different shotguns’ chamber spacing. I retained the slot width and undercut dimensions as the last two generations but shortened the pocket depth considerably, having only enough material past the undercut to reliably retain the shells. The idea being the spring pressure on the pegs would pinch the shell’s brass against the wall of the undercut, hence keeping the hull pointed in the right direction to assist with feeding them into the chambers.

To create the slotted undercut I first machined out the slot for the width that is slightly wider than SAAMI specifications for a 12-gauge shotshell and cut it 3/16” deep. I then switched to a woodruff key cutter and traversed the edges of the aforementioned slot to a width slightly wider than the SAAMI specifications for the shell’s rim diameter and then ran a chamfering bit around the peripherals to get rid of sharp edges and aid in adding shells to the loader. I then flipped the parts over and machined off the excess from machining the first side, drilled and reamed a hole for the captive pegs to slip through, and then drilled and tapped for the set screw to hold the spring and peg in place. Some mathematical work was involved in determining the depth of the pockets for the peg, spring, and set screw so that the peg would only protrude a certain amount and the spring could still provide enough pressure to ensure retention of the hulls in the loader when loaded up. I also chamfered the exposed edges pretty liberally to ensure sharp edges were eliminated, and to provide pleasing aesthetics.

Next were the pegs which was the most time-consuming part of this build. I essentially made my own version of captive dowel pins, minus the ribs normally on captive pins that anchor into a host material. They have the cross section of a capital letter “T”. I simply turned some 1/4” nominal diameter aluminum rod down to 0.124” so it slipped freely in the hole reamed out to 0.126”. I turned the shoulder back by 3/16” and filed a radius on the tip to facilitate the shell’s pushing the pins out of the way to charge the loader. I also put a generous chamfer on the other two edges to both remove sharp burrs and to allow the pin’s head to sit flat against the bottom of the pocket machined into the loader. After a test fit (dropping a finished pin into the finished pocket) I noticed that the pin fell right into place and the peg protruded the perfect distance into the slot to clamp onto the shotshell’s brass. I did the same thing for a total of 30 pieces so I had enough for all the loaders I finished making plus a few spares. They’re small parts that could be easily lost so a few spares will go a long way. After parting each piece off of the bar stock, I flipped them all around and faced the heads to 1/8” long.

I inherited a box of various size music wire springs from a friend who was cleaning out his garage and was able to dig through it and find enough identical springs to supply the entirety of my set of loaders. As for set screws, I had a box of 5/16-18 x 1/4” long cup point set screws in passivated stainless steel, plenty for putting four in each of the 7 loaders. So as part of the design, I drilled a 0.257” (“F” size bit) flat bottomed pocket deep enough to counterbore for the captive pins, and then tapped the holes for the 5/16-18 set screws deep enough to sink the screw just below flush in the loader. This pre-loaded the springs that pressed against the pegs, giving me the self-contained clamping effect I desired in this design.

After a test with some snap caps to see if the retention was what I wanted, I opened the action on my shotgun, triple checked that it was empty, and did a few test runs with the same snap caps to see if it really would work as designed. I lined up the two hulls to their respective chambers, dropped the assembly until it bottomed out, and then slid the loader forward off of the two snap caps, and the shells finished falling into place. I then pocketed the emptied loader and closed the action. They worked just as I intended! The only thing I think I would change now after testing them is to maybe put an indicating marker on the end opposite the opening for the shells to load and unload so it would be much easier to orient the assembly properly to be able to use it and not insert it backwards. In hindsight, if I wanted to alleviate that problem I could just have machined both ends open so it could be unidirectional.

Now it is onto the Sporting Clays course yet again to give these new versions a run under the circumstances likely faced there or in the field. I hope they are worth their weight in gold!

As always, thanks for reading. A special “thank you” goes out again to Robert A. Layng for the help with the spring-loaded peg idea. Shoot straight and never rest on your laurels. Always keep looking for ways to improve something that you think you’ve perfected. This project is proof of the validity of that concept and I hope it inspires another ‘smith in the future.

The push for “assault weapon” bans is a deliberate pivot to manufacture a “problem” by way of a scare tactic after realizing handgun bans weren’t working. Here’s the history.

jump the shark (idiomatic phrase)

: when a creative work or entity has reached a point in which it has exhausted its core intent and is introducing new ideas that are discordant with its original purpose

Click to watch:

Origins of “Assault Weapon” Bans

For many years, gun ban efforts largely fixated on handguns. The National Council to Control Handguns was created in 1974 and changed its name to Handgun Control, Inc. (HCI) in 1980. Jim and Sarah Brady became involved around this time, and the organization named its proposed and occasionally passed legislation after them. For example, the 1993 legislation that created the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) was formally called the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, even though NICS provides a Universal Background Check during the sale of all types of firearms by Federally Licensed (FFL) dealers, not just handguns.

However, by December 2000, the entire organization was rebranded as the Brady Campaign and Brady Center, dropping the original handgun-centric name and focus. As this occurred, Josh Sugarmann founded the Violence Policy Center in 1988 to ban all guns in America.

While all gun prohibition schemes are inherently flawed, the previous handgun-centric approach at least focused on the type of firearm that is used most often by criminals to commit crimes and homicides of all types - this includes mass shootings, regardless of how they might be defined. The paid ad above from the late 1970s, using data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Report, shows that rifles of all kinds were used in homicides 9% of the time back then. The FBI UCR has since reported that this dropped to less than 4%.

Being punched or kicked to death (called “personal weapons” in the FBI UCR) accounts for 2-3 times more deaths than ALL rifles; the AR-15 is just one type of rifle, so the number of them used criminally is even less. Given that the data proves that so-called “assault weapons” are less than half as likely to be used to commit a homicide than fists or feet, or knives, clubs, hammers, etc., why do they receive the most attention for proposed bans now?

Bogus claims about handguns began to erode even among the general lay public. This included fear-mongering that increased ownership and carry of handguns would lead to an increase in violence. However, this never happened. In 1986, one State had an unrestricted right to carry, eight had shall-issue laws, twenty-five had may-issue, and sixteen states had no issue provision to carry a concealed handgun legally. By 2023, twenty-seven states had an unrestricted right to carry, fifteen had shall-issue laws, eight had may-issue laws, and every State in the U.S. had some provision for carrying a concealed handgun legally. See the U.S. map of right-to-carry, 1986-2023 for details.

Florida started offering concealed carry permits in 1987. Here’s what happened to that state’s murder rate:

This mirrors the trend throughout the United States:

As this occurred, the rates of gun ownership in the U.S. have consistently increased:

Crime and homicide rates in the United States have continually gone down, even as some people foolishly and without evidence declared firearm ownership a “public health crisis” or “epidemic.”

More people own more guns, and more citizens are carrying more handguns in more places and more often, and the rate of violence in the U.S. continues to go down. The claimed “wild west shootouts” and scare tactics over increased violence never occurred. Public support for handgun bans also declined.

Maintaining a policy against the general public legally owning and carrying handguns was increasingly contrary to reality and public opinion. Because gun control has nothing to do with safety or helping anyone, these organizations pivoted toward a different scare tactic.

The “Assault Weapon” Pivot

A policy paper by the Violence Policy Center explains the rationale behind the pivot from handguns to “assault weapons.”
https://www.vpc.org/studies/awaconc.htm

From Assault Weapons and Accessories in America by VPC

• ‘It will be a new topic in what has become to the press and public an "old" debate.’

“Although handguns claim more than 20,000 lives a year, the issue of handgun restriction consistently remains a non-issue with the vast majority of legislators, the press, and public… Assault weapons—just like armor-piercing bullets, machine guns, and ‘plastic’ firearms—are a new topic. The weapons' menacing looks, coupled with the public's confusion over fully automatic machine guns versus semi-automatic assault weapons—anything that looks like a machine gun is assumed to be a machine gun—can only increase the chance of public support for restrictions on these weapons.”

• ‘Efforts to restrict assault weapons are more likely to succeed than those to restrict handguns.’

“[M]any Americans do believe that handguns are effective weapons for home self-defense and the majority of Americans mistakenly believe that the Second Amendment of the Constitution guarantees the individual right to keep and bear arms. Yet, many who support the individual's right to own a handgun have second thoughts when the issue comes down to assault weapons. Assault weapons are often viewed the same way as machine guns and ‘plastic’ firearms—a weapon that poses such a grave risk that it's worth compromising a perceived constitutional right.”

No, this is not from a leaked internal document. VPC publicly released this in the 1990s, and it remains on their website to this day. The references to “plastic” firearms were due to the then-current scare tactic over Glock handguns being wrongly claimed to defeat metal detectors.

Malcolm Gladwell interviewed Josh Sugarmann about his policy positions. Click to watch:

Handgun bans weren’t working, and the general public was increasingly skeptical about them. Proposed bans on inexpensive handguns (“Saturday Night Specials”), which were at the forefront of American gun debates, were failing. The “plastic gun” scare - best summed up in the nonsensical dialogue by Bruce Willis in the 1990 movie Die Hard 2 (“The Glock 7, a porcelain gun made in Germany that doesn't show up on your airport X-ray machines and costs more than what you make in a month") - faded when law enforcement mass adopted them to replace duty revolvers and the even the lay public realized it was nonsense. Concealed carry provisions increased, more people owned more handguns and carried them in public more frequently, all while rates of violence declined and approval for handgun bans dropped from 60% to 20%.

So the “assault weapon” boogeyman was invented in the hopes that the general public could be swayed. Gun prohibitionists deliberately attempt to exploit the general public’s lack of understanding and stated as much in at least one public policy paper. The “new topic” about assault weapons was invented as leverage to exploit the general public’s misunderstanding about different kinds of firearms.

The sole motivation is gaining leverage to ban something - anything - regardless of whether there’s any valid reason to believe that it will help. “Anything that looks like a machine gun is assumed to be a machine gun” demonstrates the deliberate scare tactic among the gun ban fraternity, with many politicians who really don’t understand the difference, along with the hope that enough of the general public also doesn’t understand.

This also follows the pivot away from gun control (with organization names like National Council to Control Handguns and Handgun Control, Inc.) toward “gun sense” and “gun safety” - prohibition efforts sound less draconian if billed as “safety” and “common sense” rather than as “control.”

Hanlon's razor is an adage that states: Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity. Proposed bans on “assault weapons” are a product of both.

Robert M. Layng is a Machinist/Technician for the Engineering Division at Lafayette College in Easton, Pennsylvania. He has been in machine shops since his high school vocational school years. A 2008 graduate of the Toolmaking Technology program at Pennsylvania College of Technology in Williamsport, he specializes in prototyping and practical design. Robert has been a contributing author for American Gunsmith magazine.

Robert also hosts the new weekly podcast, “The Daily Grind” by Cutting Tool Engineering Magazine, live Monday mornings at 8 am Eastern, uploaded to major streaming platforms on Tuesday morning. He also contributes regularly to the magazine. The Daily Grind podcast can be found at CTE’s website, YouTube, Spotify, and Apple Podcasts:

https://engineering.lafayette.edu/rob-layng-to-host-new-daily-grind-podcast-for-cutting-tool-engineering
Cutting Tool Engineering Magazine:
“The Daily Grind” by Cutting Tool Engineering Magazine with Robert M. Layng
YouTube:
https://www.youtube.com/@CuttingToolEngineering/podcasts
Spotify:
CTE “The Daily Grind” with Robert M. Layng
Apple Podcast:
The Daily Grind

He enjoys hearing feedback from his audiences, and can be reached at layngr@gmail.com and https://www.linkedin.com/in/rob-layng-604031391

“Forward Assist-ance Needed”

by R. M. Layng

An AR-platform chambered in the straight-wall thumper 450 Bushmaster with feeding issues came across my bench. Here I lay out my troubleshooting methods and the fix, which turned out to be the simplest thing.

Recently, a friend of the family approached me about looking at a rifle he recently acquired for a hunt out West. He mentioned it is having a persistent feeding problem wherein the bolt will not finish its travel into battery when chambering a round, at all! When seating an empty magazine and tripping the bolt release, the bolt carrier group went fully into battery every single time. Only when feeding a round into the chamber did it bind up repeatedly. The forward assist was needed to drive the bolt the last little bit to lock-up. Even when test firing before beginning my work, the rifle essentially was a single shot. It would reliably eject the spent brass but would choke on the next fresh round and stop short of returning to battery.

Back at my work bench, I began to take the rifle apart, spreading the parts into subsystems like the bolt carrier group, lower receiver, etc. I decided I would look at the upper assembly first, checking for cleanliness, chamber conditions, or any other cause of a failure to feed. I first inspected the feed ramp, being such a large bore and single-stack magazine, this rifle only has one large feed ramp. I checked for any burrs or raised edges for the bullet to catch on but found none. The ramp was finely polished, too. A nice touch. With a suitable back light, a visual inspection of the chamber showed a clean ream, free of any skips or ridges. I also compared this finding to my snap caps and some recently fired brass casings, both of which showed no scoring or scraping.

Since the brass casings were so cleanly ejected, I wasn’t concerned about the alignment of the gas tube to the gas port in the barrel and gas block. The bolt assembly showed some uneven wear on the top surface of the staked gas key, but nowhere else. This led me to believe that the carrier is canted in the raceways as it moves, potentially causing feeding issues. Upon thorough inspection and cleaning of the raceways I found no other uneven wear, so I put the theory of a canted bolt carrier group to bed.

I was then suspect of the recoil spring and buffer in this particular rifle, so that was where I focused my attention next. The incorrect weight of recoil buffer can, and will, mess with a rifle’s diet. Upon inspection I found that part to be of the proper weight for this rifle’s chambering, so I moved onto the next potential problem.

Out of sheer curiosity I grabbed a snap cap and attempted to click the rim in under the extractor to test its movement and to test the strength and function of the ejector plunger. It is here that I found the cause of the problem! For some reason, the case rim had a bear of a time fitting in under that extractor. Once I was able to get the rim clicked in, I found that the ejector plunger was strong and working just as designed. With this information, I focused on the root of the issue at hand. Now to get to that extractor.

To access the extractor, standard take down of the bolt carrier group is as follows: Once removed from the upper assembly, locate and remove the firing pin retention pin (it resembles a flattened cotter pin). Remove the firing pin from the bolt carrier group by tilting the assembly rearward until it falls into your hand. Next, ensure the bolt is in its rearward or “locked” position. This will allow access to the cam lock pin, now rotate it 90 degrees to clear the staked gas key and lift it out of the assembly. Remove the bolt from the front of the assembly. At this point you’ll have access to the extractor pivot pin. This pin can be easily drifted out using a small punch, being sure to capture the extractor as you do so. After the pin is free, lift out the extractor (which should include the return spring). This is where I finally found the cause of the feeding issue! Whomever assembled this rifle either installed an unnecessary O-ring (as is found in the old way of assembling an AR’s bolt) or left in one from the factory. Either way, it was binding up the operation of the extractor and not letting it move far enough in its stroke to click up over the case rim! I am aware of the older doctrine of having an O-ring around that stalk and spring to cushion the movement and prolong the life of the assembly, but with modern updates and stronger parts, this is seen as no longer needed. After removing the offending O-ring and placing it in a baggie for safe keeping, I checked the spring compression strength and status of the stalk. Once I was satisfied that this assembly was in good working order, I decided to test my findings by reassembling the rifle and testing the feeding with some snap caps. Assembly is in the reverse order of what I laid out before.

Once the bolt carrier group was assembled and inserted back into the upper receiver, I inserted a magazine loaded with snap caps and racked the charging handle. Much to my satisfaction, the bolt assembly slammed home without the need for the forward assist to finish the job! Running the charging handle repeatedly until the hold-open tripped on an empty magazine, I was delighted to see flawless feeding. At the range, I locked the bolt to the rear and inserted a fresh magazine full of shells and tripped the bolt release. The gratifying “kah-chunk” of the rifle no longer choking on a fresh round, and completing its travel into battery, was only amplified by the fact that the rifle now reliably fed through magazine after magazine of ammo until I was out of shells! After a thorough cleaning, the rifle was returned to its happy owner.

I hope that this article can help another gunsmith, or “mechanic” as AR enthusiasts sometimes refer to themselves, who may run into this or a similar issue with “America’s Favorite Rifle”. Your project’s chambering may differ, but the issues that may arise can all be solved the same or a similar manner. Thanks for reading!

Also, please support our new channel at BitChute by viewing and subscribing for free: https://www.bitchute.com/video/N7yZqnxK6duO

The U.S. Army enacted a Distinguished Marksman program in 1884, a shooting program that has since been opened up to all branches of the military and all civilian shooters. In the 140-year history of the program, with several hundred million marksmen and tens of millions of military personnel eligible to try, by the end of 2025, fewer than 1,300 people have earned a Distinguished rating more than once.

Captain Horace Wayman Bivins was the first person to earn both Distinguished Rifleman and Distinguished Pistol Shot in 1894. A Corporal at the time. Cpt. Bivins was also the first marksman to win three Army marksmanship gold medals in one year.

These shooting events are open to everyone. This video explains how to get on a shooting team and become a sponsored shooter:

Cpt. Bivins had a military career that was so varied and full of adventure that early newspapers wrote his life’s account ‘‘reads like fiction from the imagination of a pulp magazine writer.” He was assigned to Troop E of the 10th Cavalry, which took a prominent part in the campaigns against Geronimo, Apache Kid, and other Indian chieftains of the southwest. While serving in Cuba during the Spanish-American War, Bivins was awarded a Silver Star for actions during the famous battle of San Juan Hill. A sergeant by then, Bivins was assigned to a Hotchkiss gun battery. With all other members of his unit killed or wounded, he single-handedly fired 72 shells from a Hotchkiss gun, which recoiled six to eight feet after each shot. His performance was all the more remarkable because early in the battle, he had been knocked out briefly by a slug that passed through an iron-plated hub of a gun carriage and hit him in the temple. President Teddy Roosevelt recalled the action, “I don’t think it an exaggeration to say that but for the timely aid of the 10th Cavalry, the Rough Riders would have been annihilated.”

Cpt. Horace Wayman Bivins, the first Double Distinguished marksman in United States history in 1894, was an African American. It would take more than five decades after this for Jack Roosevelt “Jackie” Robinson to receive the same acceptance in baseball, as detailed in the movie 42. Lieutenant Colonel Earl Woods, father of pro golfer Tiger Woods, served two tours in Vietnam as an officer in the Infantry and Special Forces. While in college, Woods was not allowed to play golf because of his skin color. In fact, the Professional Golfer’s Association of America (PGA) enforced a “Caucasians only” clause in their official published rules until the 1960s. Marksmanship competition is objective and doesn’t have these restrictions. Buffalo Soldiers competed and medalled in these events decades before being allowed to freely participate in baseball and golf.

Shooting competition has a long history of providing opportunities for everyone, as explained in this video:

Army marksmanship programs trace their lineage to when General Philip Sheridan officially created the Distinguished Marksman class, as announced in official General Orders back in 1884 and formalized in 1887.

The original concept has been run continuously ever since. Marksmen participate in Excellence In Competition events, and the top ten percent of eligible, non-distinguished competitors are awarded “Leg” points. Like the leg of a journey, points are accumulated over the shooter’s lifetime for specific awards. The first leg is the EIC Bronze medal. After 20 lifetime points are accumulated, the Silver EIC medal is awarded. Once 30 or more points are earned, the shooter reaches Distinguished status. EIC events are held for rifle and pistol shooting, and there are Distinguished Rifleman and Distinguished Pistol Shot badges.

These awards are more prominent than normal qualification badges and are eligible for wear on dress uniforms. Like combatives, instead of Level 1-4 to recognize accomplishment, Bronze, Silver, and Gold badges are awarded. Army marksmanship programs are published in Army Regulation 350-66 and 140-1, with the awards and their wear detailed in 670-1. The other services have similar regulations.

Distinguished marksmen come from all walks of life, even outside the military. The CMP maintains all master records dating back to 1884 in its Competition Tracker.

Read more about Cpt. Bivins at the CMP: https://ct.thecmp.org/app/v1/index.php?do=contactDistinguishedView&distinguished_id=1370

Cpt. Bivens National Cemetery listing: https://www.dyingtotelltheirstories.com/home/2020/3/5/qtznpg8giquyff1bwnaldudl2lgl95?fbclid=IwAR0vcbtW10iNiFboWYpO9wFxWmQnYhixjaQDmM2%E2%80%A6

Billings Library history: https://billingslibrary.org/DocumentCenter/View/4172/BivinsHorace

Soldiers have chance to distinguish themselves:
https://www.army.mil/article/31928/soldiers_have_chance_to_distinguish_themselves

National Archives: Buffalo Soldiers

#BlackHistoryMonth

Robert M. Layng is a Machinist/Technician for the Engineering Division at Lafayette College in Easton, Pennsylvania. He has been in machine shops since his high school vocational school years. A 2008 graduate of the Toolmaking Technology program at Pennsylvania College of Technology in Williamsport, he specializes in prototyping and practical design. Robert has been a contributing author for American Gunsmith magazine.

Robert also hosts the new weekly podcast, “The Daily Grind” by Cutting Tool Engineering Magazine, live Monday mornings at 8 am Eastern, uploaded to major streaming platforms on Tuesday morning. He also contributes regularly to the magazine. The Daily Grind podcast can be found at CTE's website, YouTube, Spotify, and Apple Podcasts:

https://engineering.lafayette.edu/rob-layng-to-host-new-daily-grind-podcast-for-cutting-tool-engineering
Cutting Tool Engineering Magazine:
“The Daily Grind” by Cutting Tool Engineering Magazine with Robert M. Layng
YouTube:
https://www.youtube.com/@CuttingToolEngineering/podcasts
Spotify:
CTE “The Daily Grind” with Robert M. Layng
Apple Podcast:
The Daily Grind

He enjoys hearing feedback from his audiences, and can be reached at layngr@gmail.com and https://www.linkedin.com/in/rob-layng-604031391

Bushingless 1911 Takedown Tool

Here’s an overview of how I built a “21st Century fix” for disassembling smaller 1911 handguns and those with bull barrels and no bushings for cleaning or maintenance.

by R. M. Layng

An interesting project came across my bench a short time back involving the smaller size of 1911 family of pistols, specifically those with bull barrels and no conventional bushings in the front that need to be rotated out of the way for the recoil spring to be removed.

To those of us that either have or have worked on one of these smaller size pistols we know the difficulty that can arise when needing to field strip one of these little monsters. You need to retract the slide a ways, insert a cross pin into that tiny hole in the recoil guide rod, gently let the slide forward and then off the frame to be able to remove the recoil assembly, and then the barrel. I used to resort to a tiny 1/32” hex wrench that was ground off to just the perfect length to facilitate the disassembly. Fishing that out of the slide when taken apart, and then fishing it back in through the reverse recoil spring plug was a pain - albeit a small one, pun intended.

After much thought and speaking with the pistol’s owner (longtime family neighbor Robert W. Clark), along with a few other machinist friends, a preliminary design was cooked up. The thought process revolved around finding a part of the recoil assembly that would not affect cycling should it be slightly modified. It was decided that I would drill and tap a hole at the end of the recoil guide rod for an 8-32 thread. The guide rods on both of the pistols I measured were 5/16”, plus or minus a few thousandths. Using this as a basis for the tool, I decided to drill the interior of the new takedown tool to 21/64”, allowing for any inconsistency in the threading of the guide rod, the stud in the tool itself, etc. I had 3/8” stainless steel drill rod on hand, left over from another job. This size of material fit perfectly into the pocket holding the reverse plug and still pressed against the plug, all while still allowing the slide to travel over it to allow disassembly. Jackpot!

Next was finding the length I needed. For this Commander size model, I measured from the end of the guide rod to the furthest end of the hole for a length I would need to successfully depress upon the reverse spring plug and effect the removal of the recoil assembly, in this case 3/8”. I made the pocket 1/2” deep to make sure I would depress the reverse plug far enough. Adding to that a 1/4” wall for the threaded stud to anchor to, giving me 8 screw threads to hold onto and allow me the “meat” to drill through the side for a roll pin to keep the screw from backing out in use. Next, I drilled just shy of the depth as measured with a standard drill, and then ground the cutting edge of another drill bit to cut a flat-bottomed hole, and finished drilling the hole to depth. I then ran a tap drill for an 8-32 thread through the part and threaded that hole for the stud. Just to make sure the stud stays in place, an extra added measure was to stake the stud in my new adapter with the cross-drilled hole and roll pin that I mentioned before. As a side note, I have noticed different manufacturers and models all have different locations of the pin hole on the length of the recoil guide rod so I made appropriate takedown adapters for each of these different models. Should you decide to do something like this, I would suggest using the formula I laid out and just change the depth of your pocket and overall length to account for what you’ve measured for your exact pistol.

Not knowing exactly how this would function, being a completely new design for me, I made three prototypes with all three identical in the pocket for the guide rod but slightly different on the outside where the 8-32 screw gets anchored. The first is the shortest, 3/4” in length but a complete cylinder in shape. The next one was slightly longer at 7/8” in length but having a counter bored hole on the opposite end of the pocket to account for a socket head cap screw. Lastly, the third model was also 7/8” in length but the end was rounded off. The thinking behind this was that I’d like to find out which design allowed the guide rod to be removed from the slide once it was taken off of the frame while still keeping the reverse plug and recoil spring compressed.

Next, I clamped on the guide rod in a collet in a lathe. This is a self-centering setup so I don’t need to spend the time dialing it true; a real quick fix to drill and tap the end of the rod. I drilled with a tap drill on the smaller end of the acceptable scale for an 8-32 thread. This was to ensure that the adapter’s stud doesn’t strip the threads of the guide rod under the recoil spring’s pressure, and this also helps retain the set screw that fills the hole when the pistol is fully assembled. Permanently modifying the end of the guide rod like this might not look great when left empty, so I plug the threaded hole with a set screw when the pistol is assembled and ready to fire, but this does not affect the cycling of the pistol while shooting.

Using this new adapter supplants the use of the cross pin in the tiny hole already in the guide rod. Lock the slide back as normal, remove the set screw, thread on the adapter, and slowly let the slide back down onto this new adapter. Don’t drop the slide by releasing the slide stop as you’ll both shear off the small threads and damage the housing of the tool itself. This compresses the recoil spring under the reverse plug, just as the cross pin would, and allows taking the pistol down in the normal way prescribed in your owner’s manual. Remove the slide lock and run the slide off the frame. Upend the slide and remove the recoil assembly and then slide the barrel out the front of the slide. You can now do your cleaning or maintenance as needed, and then reverse this order to reassemble the pistol, making sure to lock the slide back before removing the adapter. You don’t want the spring pressure to launch the adapter across the room once you’ve run out of threads. Plus, the heavy recoil spring pressure would bind the whole thing up, anyway.

Thanks for reading, and I hope this helps other ‘smiths should they find themselves looking for a modern-day solution to this same age-old problem. A special thanks and point of recognition goes out to Mr. Robert W. Clark whose original conundrum lead to this design going from merely talking about a fix to becoming a fleshed-out prototype. Your input and inspiration helped find a fix to a problem I also face in my Officer’s model. I hope this works for your pistols as well, should you decide to do something similar!

American Gunsmith Video and Article Series

Click/tap to see our entire free Video and Article series for Gunsmiths.

I’ve also created a second free library of Gunsmith videos at a firearm-friendly video hosting service. Click to view and subscribe here:

https://www.bitchute.com/funshoot

https://www.bitchute.com/playlist/uWIXyy0Lkmik/

These checklists assume the goal of your next project is to build or modify the best possible firearm efficiently. That may not be your primary motivation - and that’s perfectly fine! - but that’s the assumption here.

During my fourteen years as editor of American Gunsmith, we published well over 900 unique gunsmithing articles by a diverse range of talented gunsmiths. There was a host of motivations behind each of those projects. Sometimes, sentimental value or satisfying curiosity was the primary goal, and those are admirable reasons. Here, our focus is efficiency.

Action Plan

An action plan for those who love accessories but also need to improve on the underlying skills.

The point here is not to tell you what to like or spend your money on. Look at it like this: You’re best off if you take a breather and plan out how you want to make gains. Everyone is going to prioritize different facets of their shooting performance.

1. Consistency is everything. Are you being consistent in the entire process of sending a projectile down range?

2. Have you chronographed your loads? If you don’t have a chronograph or know that you won’t be handloading at any time in the future – invest in better, more consistent ammunition from factory

3. Is your optic properly mounted and unable to loosen up inadvertently?

4. Has your bore been cleaned properly, inspected for fouling or imperfections, and potentially lapped to even out inconsistencies or improve the anti-fouling behavior?

5. Are you understanding the forces that are in play, not only from a macro perspective (wind, heat, target movement, actual range variables), but from a perspective of “as each shot is taken”?

6. Is your ammunition matched to a proper barrel length, twist rate, and the precision measurements of the chamber? Do you have play in your components or problems with a dirty gas system (if it’s a self-loader), or improperly fitted parts? Do you have a trigger that works with you, not against you?

7. Is your bipod, sandbag, gun rest or bench properly serviced, put together, and functioning on the level?

A note: the biggest improvement is in finding a repeatable, tightly held grouping of assets and procedures that you can use the same way each time. In real world terms: find the most consistent ammunition. Use it in a way that doesn’t alter it, even if it means handloading it into the chamber. Make your setup rock-solid so that variables in the real world cannot change it (e.g., loctite your scope mounts; buy a legitimate bipod, etc.). Take the shot using the same breathing patterns, and knowing exactly what you expect, take notes when things don’t materialize properly – always have a pen and paper. Get intimately familiar with the adjustments on your scope.

Don’t be afraid to think through any changes in your point of aim versus your point of impact – take your time on it. Demand improvement – hold yourself accountable for consistency and push to understand what you are doing on the molecular level before you send a shot downrange.

In case you are getting frustrated, don’t just send more lead down range – stop and remind yourself that some shots cost you $3. Or $2, or whatever premium price point you have bought your chosen cartridge at. The realization that dollar bills are launching down range may have the effect of slowing down your thinking and helping you to reexamine core principles to assess where something is going wrong.

List of accessories that can have a major impact on accuracy:

1. Barrel, of proper length to maximize velocity at the moment of muzzle exit – not because peak velocity is most important, but because standard deviation spread is a killer of accuracy, and specifically of shot groupings. The twist rate is also of incredible importance – especially since, once you find a load, you probably aren’t going to be changing it

2. Rock solid mounting hardware that bridges the gun properly to form a monolithic mount for your optic. The mounting is more important than the optic in most cases – at least under 600 yards

3. Is the cartridge you are shooting inherently capable of the type of accuracy you desire? If you’re trying to squeeze ¼ MOA out of a .50 Beowulf, You’re going to be very disappointed (yes the bullet diameter is bigger than the group size you are hoping for – it was meant as an extreme example)

4. Buy the best cartridge option you can afford to shoot a large volume of ammunition, whether it’s 224 Valkyrie or 6.5 Creedmoor or 338 Lapua.

5. Do you understand precision shooting math and how to gather and interpret variables at the time of shooting? Maybe some input gathering tools are in order? Think rangefinder, wind identification tooling and gauges or ballistics books

6. Buy the best glass you can afford

A final word about accessories. If you are sure that you want a specific type of component or accessory, don’t settle for a lesser one, you will undoubtedly regret it. Wait until it comes back in stock and buy the one you want. A perfect example: sure, there are plenty of 18” 6.5 Creedmoor barrels available right now, but you are positive you need a 24” barrel at least to achieve the right velocity consistency and get the most out of the rounds you are loading. Wait for the 24” or 26” barrel to get back in stock, or have a bespoke barrel made.

Conclusions

Buy the things that make you better, but also invest in yourself. Learn the baseline best practices. Buy more ammunition to shoot. Dial in your consistent routines, and loads, and procedures, and practices. Ultimately, the match and balance between the barrel, and the cartridge, and your mindset, will combine for the most important variables you can reasonably be expected to contribute to the precision long-range shooting process.

Australia’s Gun Rules Explained:

As I’m sure you’ve heard, the “terrible thing that only happens in the United States” happened in Australia. Many were quick to praise their draconian gun prohibitions as “still necessary” while data from Australia’s government indicates otherwise.

Australia has indeed enjoyed a low homicide rate for decades since enacting its gun bans in 1996-1997; however, there are several problems with attributing this to these laws.

1. If Australian gun policy was the cause of their declining homicide rate, how did that decline begin almost a decade before those bans were enacted?

2. If Australian gun policy was the cause of their declining homicide rate, why did that decline also include homicides not involving firearms?

3. If Australian gun policy was the cause of their declining homicide rate, why did the United States experience a nearly identical decline during the same time period?

The reason I’m certain you’ve heard of the shooting at Bondi Beach is because of the massive international attention it received. Perceptions of guns being uniquely dangerous are a product of reporting, not reality. This phenomenon has been formally studied even as most people remain unaware.

Meanwhile, more common occurrences that are statistically deadlier don’t even register. One example, the CDC - an organization that has declared firearms as a “public health crisis” - recognizes on its website that choking to death while eating kills 12 times more people than those killed with rifles every year - AR-15 or otherwise. Also, twice as many people are killed by being punched or kicked to death.

The CDC also recognizes traveling by motor vehicle as one of the most dangerous activities most people engage in, but has yet to declare it a public health crisis.

“But we need cars” is a common retort. Do we need kids to die playing school sports? Still waiting for the CDC to declare this a public health crisis.

Guns are “bad” because too many people are ignorant about them. Rare events are amplified and perceived as having an outsized danger, while common dangers are ignored. Most military personnel are novices with firearms, and people still misperceive them as “experts” because they don’t know any better. Add in reporting bias and fearmongering, particularly when it’s tax-deductible for a small number of wealthy donors, and you’ll have pearl-clutching voters who have never held a real firearm trying to inflict their uninformed opinion as government-enforced, taxpayer-funded policy.

The push to ban “assault weapons” is a manufactured pivot:

Why gun bans can never help citizens:

The truth behind GVA “school shooting” statistics:

Gun Law Reality

The typical person in the United States will be neither aided nor harmed by a gunshot. When examining the right to keep and bear arms, either side is looking at the marginal benefits on a scale of single digits or less per 100,00 population on an annual basis.

The most clear and commonly used statistic is the intentional homicide rate compared to the firearm ownership rate. Comparing these two, there is no correlation between cross-sectional firearm ownership rate and intentional homicide rate globally or regionally.

Here is an article illustrating the issue for US states. Here’s another covering regional and global breakdowns. Here’s another covering OECD standard developed countries and global stats. Here is a before-and-after analysis regarding various gun bans. Feel free to check the numbers as they are publicly available.

Australia Gun Laws

Australia is frequently cited as an example of successful gun control, but no research has been able to show conclusively that the Australian NFA had any effect. In fact, the US saw a similar drop in homicide over the same time period without enacting significant gun controls, as more fully explained in this write-up.

Similarly, the UK saw no benefit from gun control enacted throughout the 20th century. The UK has historically had a lower homicide rate than even its European neighbors since the 14th Century. Despite the UK’s major gun control measures in 1968, 1988, and 1997, homicides generally increased from the 1960s up to the early 2000s. Also, it wasn’t a massive increase in the number of law enforcement officers in the UK that caused the homicide rates to decrease.

Note that I cite overall homicide rates, rather than firearm homicide rates. This is because I presume that you are looking for marginal benefits in the outcome. Stabbed to death, beaten to death, or shot to death is an equally bad outcome unless you ascribe some irrational extra moral weight to a shooting death. Reducing the firearm homicide rate is not an improvement if it is simply replaced by other means, which seems to be the case.

Proposed bans on “assault weapons” intended to ban certain semi-automatic rifles are even more absurd, as rifles of all kinds are the least commonly used weapon for homicide, losing out to blunt instruments, personal weapons (hands and feet), and knives. More people are killed by being punched or kicked to death than shot with any kind of rifle - “assault” or otherwise.

As for the more active value of the right to keep and bear arms, the lowest credible estimates of Defensive Gun Use that even anti-gun Everytown agrees with are in the range of 55-80k each year, which is about 16.9-24.5 per 100k; some estimate it could be as high as 4.7 million DGUs per year.

Additionally, there is the historical precedent that every genocide of the 20th century has been enacted upon a disarmed population. The Ottomans disarmed the Armenians. The Nazis disarmed the Jews. The USSR and China (nationalists and communists) disarmed everyone. Events of this scale are mercifully rare but are extraordinarily devastating. The modern US, and certainly not Europe, is not somehow specially immune from this sort of slaughter except by its people being aware of how they were perpetrated, and they always first establish arms control over citizens.

Let’s examine the moral math on this: Tyrannical governments killed about 262 million people in the 20th century. The US represents about 4.5% of the world population. 0.045 × 262,000,000 / 100 = 123,514 murders per year by tyrannical governments on average for a population the size of the US.

Considering how gun control (or lack thereof) is statistically uncorrelated with homicide rates, and that there were 11,004 murders with firearms in the US in 2016, the risk assessment ought to conclude: Yes, the risk of tyrannical government is statistically much greater than any possible risk that general firearm ownership could represent.

The historical evidence of disarmament preceding atrocity indicates that genocidal maniacs generally just don’t want to deal with an armed population, but can the US population actually resist the federal government, though? Time for more math.

The US population is about 326 million. Conservative estimates of the US gun-owning population is about 115 million. The entire US military, including civilian employees and non-combat personnel, is about 2.8 million. Less than half of that number (1.2M) is active duty. Less than half of the military is combat arms, with support personnel making up the majority. In a popular insurgency, the people themselves are the support for combat units of the insurgency, which therefore means that active insurgents are combat units, not generally support units.

You have, optimistically, 600,000 federal combat troops vs 1% (1.15 million) of exclusively the gun owning Americans actively engaged in an armed insurgency, with far larger numbers passively or actively supporting said insurgency.

The military is now outnumbered 2:1 by a population with small arms roughly comparable to their own and significant education to manufacture IEDs, hack or interfere with drones, and probably the best average marksmanship of a general population outside of maybe Switzerland. Additionally, this population includes 19.6 million veterans, including 4.5 million who have served after 9/11, who are potentially trainers, officers, or NCOs for this force.

The only major things the insurgents are lacking are armor, air power, and proper anti-material weapons. Armor and air aren’t necessary, or even desirable, for an insurgency. Anti-material weapons can be imported or captured, with armored units simply not being engaged by any given unit until materials necessary to attack those units are acquired. Close-air like attack helicopters are vulnerable to sufficient volumes of small arms fire and .50 BMG rifles. All air power is vulnerable to sabotage or raids while on the ground for maintenance.

This is before even before we address the defection rate from the military, or how police and National Guard units will respond to the military killing their friends, family, and neighbors.

Basically, a sufficiently large uprising could absolutely murder the military. Every bit of armament the population has necessarily reduces that threshold of “sufficiently large”. With the raw amount of small arms and people who know how to use them in the US, “sufficiently large” isn’t all that large in relative terms.

Formal studies confirm this phenomenon, with Dunning-Kruger Effect being a famous one. This video discusses how many people misquote Dr. Dunning’s studies, which further proves the findings:

This article has more details:

Occasionally, reason prevails:

After watching and reading numerous Close Quarters Battle tactics videos and articles, I decided to test some of them out with a friend using Airsoft guns.

I had previously participated in formal CQB training in the Marine Corps, specifically Security Forces at De Luz Combat Town, Camp Pendleton. My buddy is not trained in CQB techniques or weapons handling; his only previous “experience” was playing First Person Shooter video games. I acted as an attacker with the intent of breaching the room while my buddy would defend it and prevent me from making entry.

Long story short, most of the tactics I had learned and practiced beforehand went out of the window; it was about 50/50 on who would shoot first. The two things that consistently did help were:

1. Being a better shooter helped land hits when the decision to shoot was made.

2. Pieing the room to clear it.

I Iearned some valuable lessons:

• CQB can be a game of chance.

• It’s surprisingly easy for an untrained but motivated individual to smoke someone trained and practiced in CQB.

• Marksmanship skills are more important than CQB shenanigans. “Good” tactics vary. Consistent, fast hits do not.

One of my favorite quotes from an instructor: “There’s a million and one ways to do CQB and not one of them is necessarily right. If there was one single tactic that worked 100% of the time, everyone would be using it.” The fact there’s so many different tactics, approaches, and discussions about this demonstrates the point.

Here is the difference between training shooting skills tactically and competitively: There is no difference. Shooting is shooting. Objectively improving your grip/mount, vision, manipulation, accuracy and speed in one setting helps for the other.

I have been on a two way range. I have trained tactics and CQB at some of the best schools available. I have trained with Green Berets and Grandmaster-level competitive shooters. They all have one thing in common: You can never train the hard skills enough.

Hard skills are what enable you to employ tactics. Tactics, while not simple, can be learned rather quickly. It often comes down to having a base of tactical knowledge and then making decisions on the fly and improvising. Improved hard skills enable better improvisation.

If you can’t control your body or base your decisions on the context of whether you are in a match or a gunfight, then you should not be involved in either activity.
- @HavocTwoOne

The difference between soft and hard skills

Hard skills are specific, measurable abilities. Hard skills can be assessed objectively and learned. There’s not much leeway between good and bad in any context.

Soft skills are subjective and vary greatly. Soft skills are not readily measured because “good” is entirely dependent upon specific situational factors.

Tactics are very subjective and epitomize soft skills. It’s about minimizing risk and maximizing the chance of success, and they vary greatly depending on the environment and situation.

Marksmanship is very objective and epitomizes hard skills. Good shooting can be readily measured, and improving it is consistently beneficial in every environment and situation.

This does NOT mean tactics are unimportant, only that they’re subjective, difficult to quantify, and situation-dependent. Working through a specific situation and making good, fast decisions will be helped by getting measurable, predictable hard skills to a level such that you no longer have to give them much thought. This frees up “processing capacity” to pay attention to the immediate environment rather than fumble with low skills you should have already developed before.

Hit or Myth is a thoughtful text on approaching range exercises to learn tactical scenarios. This book is an ideal place to go once a reasonably high level of shooting skill has been obtained, but not before.

It is true that scored square range exercises and drills will only take you so far, and polishing them to ever-higher levels will show diminishing returns. That point is well illustrated in Hit or Myth.

The problem is that too many people in the tactical world use this fact as an excuse to dismiss range exercises and never learn solid marksmanship and gun handling in the first place.

Consider this crucial point made early in the book. In discussing scored range drills, Awerbuck notes, “A polished performer can consistently execute El Presidente in 7-8 seconds with a ‘near perfect’ score.” Taking earned points divided by time, this would indicate a score of seven points per second or more. Jeff Cooper’s original recommendation as a par score for a well-trained pistolero was six, and Gunsite continues to recommend around five as a minimum baseline for their students to this day.

If you or your charges are routinely shooting a range exercise like El Presidente at around six points per second or higher, or some other similar mark of decent marksmanship and gun handling prowess, then you likely are better served spending most of your time on tactical scenarios in training. Square range live fire drills should be reduced to the minimum necessary to retain the good skills already developed, and Hit or Myth will help you to that end. Force-on-Force training will also be helpful.

Here’s the rub: I challenge you to find police, military, or CCW civilians who aren’t at least occasionally shooting matches or taking classes on their own, who can shoot a range drill close to this level. They exist, but are rare. You’d be surprised (or maybe you wouldn’t) at the number failing to consistently keep all their hits somewhere on the damn target, much less in the center, regardless of elapsed time. I’ve tested both Military Police and civilian law enforcement and found this to often be the case.

Yet, some of these same low-level shooters will be the first to complain that “competition will getcha killed” and want to get a bunch of Simunitions to rush headlong into tactical scenarios.

Hit or Myth points out a number of real-world issues that standard range drills fail to address, but that doesn’t remove the need to use them. Good skills provide a solid base to establish tactics from. Crappy shooting on the range means you’ll suck everywhere else as well, which will forever hold you back in every context.

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Gunsmithing for Optimal Performance

When you are focused on accuracy, is adding another accessory able to bring you to the next level? For precision shooters – the age-old question is whether parts and accessories make the impact (that they seem to be able to in your mind) in the real world. In a day and age where many off-the-shelf rifles can get you pretty close to 1 MOA, which if any accessories can have the biggest impact, and are you fooling yourself trying to tighten up your groups with hardware rather than training and experience?

If it’s a hybrid model involving both hardware and “software” – where are the biggest impacts to be made?

This is an article that explores the relationship between what you think will make you better, what can make you better, and the value of the different variables in the equation of getting better at precision shooting. This article focuses on the AR platform because it’s a perfect platform to get trained on, and the ability to customize the modular system over time from a hardware perspective allows shooters to get better and upgrade their firearm as they go to match their skills. 

Are you fooling yourself and just trying to find a way to spend that money burning a hole in your pocket?

The short answer is no. There are plenty of improvements to be had with hardware components in the AR market. But the longer answer is far more complicated. Some of what you believe is marketing psychology at its best, and some of what you realize as improvement is just a factor of you getting better through trial and error, increased information consumption, and real world experience. It’s a combination of variables that go into your ability to improve on long-range efforts when focusing on precision shooting sports. 

But, yes, hardware does matter. Skills do matter. The harmony you create between the two of them matters most. 

And there are some accessories that have far less of an impact on our shooting than they seem to have prior to purchase. So, you’ll do well to prioritize your dollars for the hardware that makes the most sense from a value perspective and perhaps even on the training that may push you to beyond where you thought was possible. 

Reality Check

Practice makes perfect – not cool accessories. But that isn’t the whole story, is it? Let’s explore the idea behind incremental improvement and optimization on the backdrop of overall gains in performance.

A lot of precision shooters realize that the more rounds they send down range the better they get. But that’s true of everything, isn’t it? The more you experience something, the more you can digest what’s happening in real time and are able to make better judgments, and better adjustments, is what allows for incremental improvement over time anyway. 

Long-range precision shooting isn’t about immediate impacts so much as it is about long-term honing of skills. No matter how much is spent on a custom rifle, the shooter needs to be able to outperform the hardware. And as you go along – the percentage increases lessen, because you get into the cycle of optimization which is shorter up front and gets longer as you improve little by little. 

1. Don’t buy a gun that’s better than you just because you can, unless if you want to lengthen your learning curve – at least not at first. 

2. Prioritize dollars, and stack ammunition components

3. Learn to reload/handload

4. Emphasize refining your shot process – make every shot count, call it, and make every shot a routine delivery to ensure consistency

5. Ultimately, unfortunately, the AR platform is not going to be your best option for precision long-range shooting, but you can and should start on an AR because it’s super approachable and offers a lot of value

Note: while it may seem like it at times, this is not an article about how to shoot precision long range rifles. There are plenty of robust guides on that topic. This is about how you can avoid missteps in the market and on the procurement side of things, so that you can focus on the truly developmental and essential purchases that will drive you to be a better precision long-range shooter. Particularly, with the AR platform. 

Do you have your priorities straight?

Is it your goal to look cool at the range through showcasing awesome guns or awesome results? 

There is no right answer here. Car people show off their cars, even if they had nothing to do with building the engine or could not possibly harness the power the way a professional driver could. Some people indulge in watches worth more than most people’s mortgage notes. Some people buy $350 jeans. You like what you like. It’s ok to have great looking guns you are proud of. 

But the point here is about results versus loadout. And more specifically is the loadout you want, designed to get results in the form of tighter groups and faster sets and further distances? Or is it designed to get people to look at your awesome guns. Both are fine answers. There may even be a bunch of other reasons for bringing a specific gun to the range too. And that is also fine. 

If you are looking for end results that mean tighter groups, faster reaction times, and better on target performance for your chosen gun and you as the shooter, then your priorities need to involve more shooting, more focused and consistent shooting styles and the right purchases that lead to direct impacts on your ability to hit where you are aiming.

If in doubt about an accessory purchase other than optics (and sometimes with optics), buy ammunition instead with the money. That’s a no-lose situation for someone who is an avid shooter with money that’s burning a hole in their pocket.

About incremental improvement

Shooting performance improvement takes time. Yes, you can learn so much from binging on YouTube videos and reading blog posts and ultimately diving deeper and deeper until you get to the best figureheads sharing the best information. It’s possible to get yourself to a great place by simply digesting available information. 

Unfortunately, it’s hard to tell sometimes which information is best, and whether or not you are moving down the right track. A good litmus test? Real world improvement. If you’re getting better keep moving down that pathway until you hit a wall. 

At that point, reassess where you need to go, using the knowledge you gained as you improved in the most recent cycle of improvement. Your newfound wisdom will help you to further discern whether what you are hearing will be able to impact your progression properly. 

More about optimization on your performance

Optimization is the more incremental, “incremental” improvement, and really should be geared towards shaving seconds off your reaction time, or tenths of inches off your group size, and only after you have a solid base of all the technical, mental, and physical concepts surrounding precision shooting.

At some point you will outperform your AR. You may have to move on to something made from a monolithic chassis, or something that can get down to the accuracy level you really want to be at. Most people would be incredibly happy with 1 MOA out of a military design. Some configurations can push down to near ½ MOA for a few thousand dollars on the AR, but you’re not going to be doing that easily. And if you aspire to get to ¼ MOA, you will become very disappointed in the platform – it’s just not built for that type of accuracy.

Conclusions

At some point, you will not see gains in a single session of shooting. Because you can only push your hardware to its limits and improve so much each time you learn and experience it on the level you need to at that point in your progression. It’s the way this game works. Getting a 1% optimization improvement will be a goal someday. And as crazy as that sounds, you will be ecstatic when you can prove you obtained that 1% improvement at that point. Some people call that level of achievement in shooting “enlightenment” or “exaltation”.

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Forged to Kill: Competitive Marksmanship and the Infantryman’s Path to Digital Lethality

by Joe Garcia

Master Sgt. Joe Garcia currently serves as Program Manager for the California Military Department Office of Competitive Programs, where he manages the CANG Combat Shooting Team; Biathlon Team; Marathon Team; Sport Parachute Team; and Obstacle Course Racing Team. He served as a Master Firearms Trainer, Assistant State Marksmanship Coordinator, DOJ Firearms Safety Instructor, California Peace Officer Standards and Training certified firearms instructor, and CCW Instructor.

At the National Guard Marksmanship Training Center, he was a Designated Marksman and Small Arms Master Gunner Instructor, leading Mobile Training Teams to administer training on all military small arms. He helped establish a joint force pre-mobilization weapons training cadre that conducted individual weapons training for 9,390 Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors, and Marines, validating each individual’s training through qualification with their assigned weapons.

As a competitor, Garcia led the 2013, 2014, and 2015 U.S. Army All Army Small Arms Champions and has earned Distinguished marksmanship ratings.

Introduction: The Kill Gap

In the evolving landscape of modern warfare, the traditional metrics of infantry proficiency—basic qualification scores and doctrinal compliance—are insufficient to ensure battlefield dominance. The gap is not small. The rise of the peer and modern threats, with their emphasis on algorithmic warfare, persistent ISR, and long-range precision strike capabilities, changes the lethality equation (Watling & Rasser, 2023; Department of the Army, 2022; TRADOC, 2023). Modern conflict punishes hesitation, indecision, and rote training. Yet in the practical application of TC 3-20.40, much of the U.S. Army’s marksmanship instruction remains compliance-based, emphasizing safety over mastery and qualification over combat capability (Scales, 2021; U.S. Army, 2021).

Competitive marksmanship fills the critical gap. Unlike standard qualification, which merely assesses minimum competency in sterile conditions, competitive shooting develops true lethality under pressure. Competition is the collective pursuit of individual excellence. That collective pursuit is the dynamic force producing change. It forces Soldiers to perform under observation, against time, and in dynamic, unfamiliar scenarios that mimic the unpredictability of war (Miller & Bartone, 2022; Spencer, 2023; TC 3-20.40, 2020). Competition as training has no regard for rank or what you did yesterday. It’s a ten-digit grid point of your real skill level, under duress, in relation to everyone else on the map. Competition exposes truth, inoculates participants against stress and builds cognitive resilience—attributes increasingly recognized as essential for high-performance tactical units (Paulus et al., 2021; Corbett & Tack, 2021).

Emerging research supports the superiority of competitive environments for cultivating elite performance. A recent study on stress exposure and performance optimization concluded that decision-making and motor skill execution improve when training simulates the cognitive demands of combat, particularly in uncertain environments (Buchanan & Tranel, 2021; McCord, 2024; Freedman, 2022). The Army’s own Futures Command and Army University Press have acknowledged that stress-inoculated, adaptive shooters are better suited to the digitized, sensor-fused battlespace emerging under Multi-Domain Operations (Army Futures Command, 2022; Kallberg, 2022).

I’m saying that competitive marksmanship is not just useful—it is essential. It bridges the lethality gap by producing riflemen who can dominate under real pressure, perform inside the decision cycle of the enemy, and fuse weapon systems with battlefield awareness. Without it, modernization efforts will be hollow shells—platforms without punch, doctrine without killers.

Section 2: Competitive Marksmanship as Stress Inoculation Training

In the context of modern warfare, where combat is defined by cognitive overload, sensory saturation, and rapid threat engagement, Soldiers must be conditioned not just physically, but psychologically. Traditional marksmanship training does not provide the exposure to time pressure, uncertainty, and performance judgment that fosters the resilience combat demands. In contrast, competitive marksmanship imposes acute stress on the shooter through direct observation, peer comparison, and scenario complexity—hallmarks of stress inoculation training (SIT) (Bartone, 2022; Paulus et al., 2021; FM 7-22, 2020). This exposure cultivates what psychologists term “adaptive stress response,” enabling Soldiers to perform with consistency and clarity under extreme pressure (Buchanan & Tranel, 2021; FM 3-0, 2022).

Stress inoculation is more than exposure—it is a deliberate structured progression through anticipation, confrontation, and mastery of stress, which competitive events inherently replicate (Meichenbaum, 2007; Miller & Bartone, 2022). Soldiers who engage in competitive marksmanship show statistically significant improvements in focus, motor control under stress, and decision accuracy compared to those trained only under qualification standards (Baumeister & Vohs, 2016; Corbett & Tack, 2021). These findings align with the U.S. Army’s own emphasis on the integration of performance psychology into readiness, as defined in ATP 7-22.02, which promotes deliberate stress exposure as a mechanism to build resilience and improve lethality (Department of the Army, 2020; TRADOC, 2023).

Furthermore, neurophysiological studies reveal that training under realistic threat conditions activates and strengthens the same neural pathways used in combat, improving decision-making speed and reducing panic-induced degradation (Sandi, 2013; Kallberg, 2022; McCord, 2024). Competitive marksmanship forces the shooter to rapidly process visual and auditory cues, prioritize targets, and execute motor tasks under time constraints—conditions that mirror the chaos of close combat and the decision cycle required in sensor-to-shooter engagements (Freedman, 2022; Army Futures Command, 2022; TC 3-20.40, 2020).

The Army has doctrinally endorsed these findings. TC 3-20.40 explicitly outlines competitive and scenario-based shooting as valid mechanisms for preparing Soldiers for the complexities of war, noting that “standard qualification tables do not replicate the time constraints, stressors, or movement required in combat” (TC 3-20.40, 2020, p. 1-4). Similarly, FM 3-0 describes the future operational environment as characterized by tempo, ambiguity, and distributed threats—factors best countered by Soldiers trained to think and shoot under pressure (FM 3-0, 2022; TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, 2018).

In short, competitive marksmanship is not recreational—it is functional inoculation against the psychological and kinetic realities of war. There can be only one champion. The failure at competition is the inoculation. Competition conditions Soldiers to operate on the edge of failure without breaking. By embedding stress exposure through competition into marksmanship, commanders pre-harden their units, accelerating the transformation of shooters into lethal decision-makers long before the first bullet is fired in combat (Miller & Bartone, 2022; Kallberg, 2022; TRADOC, 2023).

Section 3: Cognitive and Physical Enhancements through Competitive Training

Modern infantry warfare requires Soldiers to synchronize rapid cognition with physical endurance, often under extreme stress and ambiguity. Competitive marksmanship uniquely cultivates this dual capacity by replicating the tempo, uncertainty, and physical strain found in actual combat. Cognitive neuroscience research confirms that high-performance shooting under pressure activates the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and other executive function regions, enabling faster and more accurate threat discrimination (Bishop et al., 2004; Meichenbaum, 2007; Paulus et al., 2021). These brain regions are critical for combat effectiveness, especially in environments that demand rapid shoot/no-shoot decisions, target prioritization, and movement coordination under fire (Buchanan & Tranel, 2021; Sandi, 2013).

From a performance standpoint, competitive marksmanship drives measurable improvements in motor precision, visual tracking, and executive response time. Studies have demonstrated that shooters who engage in competitive or stress-based training environments significantly outperform those trained under static, qualification-focused protocols in both speed and accuracy (Mon-López et al., 2019; Baumeister & Vohs, 2016; Freedman, 2022). These findings directly support the Army’s readiness doctrine, which stresses physical-cognitive integration as a prerequisite for success in large-scale combat operations (FM 3-0, 2022; TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, 2018).

Physiologically, the integration of anaerobic exertion before marksmanship tasks—such as sprinting, climbing, or casualty drag drills—has been shown to simulate the degradation seen in firefights. Research from Norwegian infantry trials revealed that accuracy declines significantly after high-stress exertion unless the shooter is regularly conditioned in those environments (Solberg et al., 2022; McCord, 2024). Competitive marksmanship naturally includes this kind of stress layering, preparing shooters to maintain precision during fatigue, elevated heart rate, and cortisol spikes (Sanchez et al., 2022; TC 3-20.40, 2020).

Army doctrine has begun to acknowledge the need for these integrated performance domains. ATP 7-22.02, which outlines Holistic Health and Fitness (H2F), calls for training environments that simultaneously challenge the Soldier’s physical, mental, and emotional capacities to build resilience and reduce performance degradation under combat stress (Department of the Army, 2020; FM 7-22, 2020). Competitive marksmanship achieves this goal in a field-expedient and scalable way. It replaces sterile firing lines with dynamic tasks that improve vestibular processing, proprioception, and neuromuscular stability—all while refining combat decision-making in time-compressed scenarios (Spencer, 2023; Kallberg, 2022; TRADOC, 2023).

In sum, competitive marksmanship provides a unique training method that fuses kinetic and cognitive enhancement under conditions that are realistic, repeatable, and measurable. No other training domain achieves this synthesis as effectively. It is not an extracurricular activity—it is the functional backbone of the modern rifleman’s mind-body integration.

Section 4: Institutionalizing Competitive Marksmanship in Infantry Training Pipelines

Despite the overwhelming evidence for its effectiveness, competitive marksmanship remains peripheral within Army budgets and training architecture—treated as extracurricular rather than essential. This is a strategic failure. If lethality is the core output of the infantry, and competitive marksmanship is the most direct forge of that lethality, then it must be institutionalized across the training continuum (FM 3-0, 2022; TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, 2018; Department of the Army, 2020). The Army cannot afford to leave performance excellence to chance. It must not rely solely on qualification tables. These are rote administrative diagnostic tests, that cannot replicate combat conditions (TC 3-20.40, 2020; Spencer, 2023).

Competitive marksmanship must be embedded at multiple points within the training pipeline. First, at One Station Unit Training (OSUT), elements of time-stressed and peer-observed marksmanship can be introduced in parallel to current qualification events, fostering early resilience and skill differentiation (ATP 7-22.02, 2020; FM 7-22, 2020). Second, at the unit level, commanders can schedule recurring competitions that reinforce marksmanship principles under combat-relevant stressors—improving both readiness and morale while generating actionable performance data (Kallberg, 2022; Corbett & Tack, 2021). Data beyond hit or miss, but accuracy expressed as a percentage and hits measured in time. Finally, pre-deployment cycles must include mandatory competitive engagements that expose teams to joint, inter-unit, and inter-service marksmanship standards, fostering interoperability and raising tactical ceilings (Freedman, 2022; McCord, 2024).

FORSCOM and Army Futures Command have both emphasized the importance of measurable outcomes and performance under pressure in preparation for multi-domain operations (Army Futures Command, 2022; TRADOC, 2023). Embedding competition into institutional cycles satisfies this demand. Soldiers conditioned through competitive shooting arrive at the unit-level ready to integrate with ISR platforms, sensor-fused kill chains, and distributed command architectures because they have been trained to think and shoot as a single act (Watling & Rasser, 2023; Scales, 2021). This is not recreational—this is doctrinal alignment with emergent combat realities.

Additionally, the neurocognitive and retention benefits of spaced, stress-based learning validate the regular use of competitive events in training calendars. Repeated stress-exposure with performance feedback accelerates the myelination of task-relevant neural pathways, enabling shooters to operate under pressure with minimal cognitive load (Buchanan & Tranel, 2021; Sandi, 2013; Baumeister & Vohs, 2016). Simply put: what is stressed and scored is remembered and refined. Without this integration, institutional lethality remains a paper tiger. What readiness?

If the Army intends to win in the first contact—not after the first casualty—it must stop treating competitive marksmanship as a privilege and start enforcing it as a pipeline. Lethality is not a static qualification. It is a perishable, trainable outcome—and competition is the crucible that produces it.

Section 5: Conclusion — The Last Forge

In a world of machine-speed warfare, autonomous systems, and algorithmic targeting, the infantryman’s place on the battlefield is not diminished—but redefined. He is no longer merely a bearer of firepower, but a fused node of lethality within a digital ecosystem. To survive and dominate in this environment, the infantry must evolve. That evolution begins not with modernization plans or new gear, but with the re-forging of mastery—one rifleman at a time. Competitive marksmanship is the last surviving forge where this mastery is tested, measured, and earned (Scales, 2021; Freedman, 2022; Spencer, 2023).

No checklist qualification, no static range event can prepare Soldiers for the chaos, uncertainty, and compression of modern war. Only competition – the collective pursuit of individual excellence and the dynamic force producing change, compels a shooter to integrate cognition, violence, stress control, and precision under observation. It exposes weakness. It rewards adaptation. It transforms Americans into Soldiers —before the first shot is ever exchanged with a peer threat (Buchanan & Tranel, 2021; Paulus et al., 2021; Army Futures Command, 2022).

Doctrinally, the tools are already in place. TRADOC, FORSCOM, and Futures Command have all recognized that adaptive, performance-based training is essential to Multi-Domain Operations (FM 3-0, 2022; TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, 2018; TC 3-20.40, 2020). What remains is implementation—at scale. We must remove competitive marksmanship from the budget margins and embed it as a core element of infantry pipelines, from OSUT to the line unit. Anything less will leave lethality to chance—and our Soldiers unprepared.

Threats aren’t static. We can’t be either.

If America wants riflemen to dominate on a battlefield saturated with sensors, AI, and autonomous fires, we must forge them where it matters most: under pressure, in competition, with purpose. The infantryman of the digital age must not only fire a weapon—he must master it, integrate it, and wield it with judgment faster than the enemy can think. The Soldier as a system remains a goal not yet met.

Competitive marksmanship is not optional. It’s the bridge between peacetime posture and wartime victory. It is the only path to true lethality – in the time available.

Bibliography

Army Futures Command. (2022). Project Convergence and the networked battlefield. U.S. Army.

Baumeister, R. F., & Vohs, K. D. (2016). Handbook of self-regulation: Research, theory, and applications. Guilford Press.

Bishop, S. J., Duncan, J., Brett, M., & Lawrence, A. D. (2004). Prefrontal cortical function and anxiety: Controlling attention to threat-related stimuli. Nature Neuroscience, 7(2), 184–188.

Buchanan, T. W., & Tranel, D. (2021). Stress and decision-making: Mechanisms and implications. Military Psychology, 33(1), 23–32.

Corbett, G., & Tack, N. (2021). Multi-domain operations: Tactical integration of ISR and fires. Military Review, 101(4), 33–47.

Department of the Army. (2020). ATP 7-22.02: Holistic Health and Fitness Testing.

Department of the Army. (2022). Army Techniques Publication 3-12.3: Electronic Warfare Techniques.

FM 3-0. (2022). Operations. Headquarters, Department of the Army.

FM 7-22. (2020). Holistic Health and Fitness.

Freedman, L. (2022). Command and control in contemporary conflict. Journal of Strategic Studies, 45(5), 721–743.

Kallberg, J. (2022). Cognitive dominance and decision-making in cyber-enabled conflict. Joint Force Quarterly, (106), 54–61.

McCord, C. (2024). Human-machine teaming in near-peer warfare. Army University Press.

Meichenbaum, D. (2007). Stress inoculation training: A preventive and treatment approach. Springer.

Miller, L., & Bartone, P. (2022). Hardening Soldiers through stress inoculation training. Military Psychology, 34(1), 45–60.

Mon-López, D., Tejero-González, C. M., & Refoyo, I. (2019). Performance indicators in elite shooting: A bibliometric analysis. Journal of Sports Sciences, 37(5), 507–515.

Paulus, M. P., Feinstein, J. S., Castillo, G., & Simmons, A. N. (2021). Neural mechanisms of threat processing. Current Topics in Behavioral Neurosciences, 50, 155–172.

Sandi, C. (2013). Stress and cognition. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 14(5), 311–324.

Scales, R. H. (2021). The lost art of battle command in sensor-saturated warfare. Parameters, 51(3), 19–31.

Solberg, P. A., et al. (2022). Physical fatigue and shooting accuracy in infantry Soldiers. Military Medicine, 187(9–10), 1124–1132.

Spencer, J. (2023). Urban Warfare Project: Preparing infantry for megacity conflict. Modern War Institute, West Point.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1. (2018). The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World.

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The following was written by my friend, coach, and shooting team NCOIC, Master Sgt. Robert Kolesar, a decorated veteran of both the U.S. Army and Los Angeles Police Department.

During my time as both a cop and soldier, I was fortunate to know many men (and a few women) who experienced close-quarters combat or gunfights with armed criminals. Some were just lucky they survived; others trained constantly, were mentally tough and prepared daily for what they considered an inevitable encounter.

The four men we’ll be looking at are all veterans of multiple shootings and firefights. They are, as best as I can describe them, modern samurai with rifles, shotguns and handguns. They didn’t count on luck — they trained, practiced and prevailed by constant repetition and careful preparation. Here are their stories, their fighting weapons and what they consider important from literally dozens of firefights. What you won’t be getting here are body counts or what it’s like to engage in a gunfight. These men are not about describing their shootings. But they’ve spent years training other cops and soldiers going in harm’s way on what works and how to survive and win. I’ve found their lessons and training are very similar and have relevance to a city cop on patrol, a citizen carrying lawfully concealed or a young Marine on his first combat deployment.

Patrolman Bill Allard (ret.),
NYPD SOU, ESU

NY City Patrolman Bill Allard has been in more gunfights than any other policeman in NYPD history. He was one of the initial members of the NY SOU (Stake-Out Unit) in 1968 and left when the SOU was disbanded in 1973. After leaving the SOU, he continued working the streets of New York in ESU (Emergency Services Unit), Detective Investigations and Patrol, retiring in 1981. He still lives in NY and carries a handgun daily, usually a Kimber 1911 .45. Now 75, he’s finally enjoying retirement after a second career working as a firearms consultant and instructor.

Before, during and after his career as a cop, Bill was a fierce competitor in Precision Pistol (Bullseye). In 1982 he won the national civilian championship at Camp Perry, shooting the .22 and .45. Bill is adamant you must look at your front sight in a gunfight; his years of intensive bull’s-eye practice made focusing on the front sight part of his muscle memory, even under the stress of a shooting. The basics of bull’s-eye (intense focus on the front sight and absolute trigger control) were in his training regimen and carried over into deadly encounters. As the firearms instructor for the SOU, Bill mandated high marksmanship standards for anyone selected, and conducted frequent live-fire drills for the squad. He personally tested and chronographed the loads used by SOU for accuracy, velocity and terminal performance.

During the 5 years the NYPD SOU was active, SOU never lost an officer or a gunfight in dozens of armed confrontations.

SGM (Sergeant Major)Kyle Lamb (ret.),
US Army 1st SFOD-D

SGM Kyle Lamb has been at the very “tip of the spear” in Desert Storm, Somalia and Iraq. His 21 years in the US Army reads like a Hollywood character in a movie script: 82nd Airborne Paratrooper, communications specialist in a Special Forces A-Team during “Desert Storm” and 15 years as a Delta team member. SGM Lamb was one of several Delta Soldiers heavily engaged in the fighting in Mogadishu after the downing of the Super 61 helo. He deployed five times to Iraq during the 2nd Gulf War, planning and participating in literally hundreds of direct-action missions. His advice on surviving in combat is simple: “bottom-up planning, combat marksmanship, thinking outside the box and medical training.” Something that needs to be mentioned is Delta’s usual mission, unlike a Ranger or Marine combat unit, is accomplished by stealth, not confrontation. But if it comes to a firefight, massive, overwhelming, targeted violence by experienced operators will almost always win.

Kyle has had extensive experience with the H&K 416 and MP-5 as well as the Colt M4. He preferred the M4 on combat deployments. “The M4 is a lightweight system highly reliable when lubed. It also has less recoil and is lighter than most piston systems.”

SGM Kyle Lamb kept his shooting skills at peak level between deployments by competing in 3-gun events. He told me competition increased his proficiency and pointed to areas where he could focus his future training on. He has used his competitive shooting experiences, proven in combat, to train fellow Delta teammates. Now retired, Kyle Lamb still offers training through his own school. Kyle is heavily involved with training US Army units for combat and police officers in street survival. His insights into practical marksmanship, coupled with his extensive combat time, give soldiers, cops and the civilians he’s trained a critical advantage not found anywhere else.

Police Officer III Scott Reitz (ret.),
LAPD SWAT/METRO

I first met Scotty just before the ’84 Los Angeles Olympics. I was a probationary recruit still in the Academy; Scott was a veteran team member in SWAT, where he spent 10 years of his police career. During his time on LAPD SWAT he participated in hundreds of SWAT callouts and got into several full-on gun battles. When Scott wasn’t working, he was training with other SWAT members, working as an instructor at Gunsite (Jeff Cooper’s firearms training facility in Arizona) or doing physical training. Later in his career, he was the primary LAPD SWAT and Metropolitan Division firearms instructor.

What I remember clearly about Scott Reitz was his incredible appetite for training. His marksmanship skills are exceptional with rifle, pistol, shotgun or sub-gun. If there’s ammo available, Scott will shoot it — but it’ll be done in a live-fire scenario or drill designed to increase skill, speed or accuracy. The neat thing about him is his knowledge as a trainer was available to all LAPD units, not just METRO or SWAT. He worked with every copper who asked, including probationary cops like me, dispensing life-saving tips and marksmanship techniques. Much later in my career, I had the honor and pleasure of working with him as a tactics and firearms trainer, where I saw his abilities as marksman and instructor close-up.

When not training, Scott is a physical fitness fanatic. He works out with the same intensity he has when he’s shooting. Fitness was always mentioned and stressed by him when he trained other LAPD officers. Fit cops shoot better, think more clearly and have the will, stamina and strength to survive and win. Scott Reitz is still training other cops, as well as civilians and military, in retirement. He’s an author and an internationally recognized instructor of law enforcement officers and military professionals.

Detective III John Helms (ret.),
LAPD SWAT, SIS

In a department full of urban warriors, John Helms is a legend. His entire 35-plus years on the LAPD have been spent on the streets of Los Angeles. His time “on the job” includes 8 years in SWAT and over 20 years in SIS (Special Investigations Section), the LAPD’s go-to unit when dealing with the City of Angel’s most violent felons. John has been in numerous toe-to-toe gunfights as a SWAT cop and SIS detective; one shooting resulted in his being decorated with the Department’s Medal of Valor for heroic actions during a violent hostage rescue.

Not surprisingly, John likes the 1911 as a fighting pistol, but is also aware of its limitations. As much as he likes the 1911 (John told me shooting one was “like shaking hands with an old trusted friend”), he thinks it’s a training-intensive weapon and isn’t the best solution for many people. Proper employment during high-stress incidents mandates extensive, repetitive training. Detective Helms mentioned some shooters are all about the weapon — and that’s a serious mistake. To him, the handgun is a small part of fighting and winning. Helms cautioned me about picking a “favorite” tool (firearm): “you must train and excel with whatever you’re issued.” It is, after all, just a tool. The individual involved in the struggle is the irreplaceable item that wins the fight.

John started his police career with S&W revolvers and understands their role in defensive shootings well. In 1984, while assigned to SWAT, he partnered up with Larry Mudgett (also LAPD SWAT) and taught the November ’84 LAPD recruit class Cooper’s modern technique of the pistol. It was a groundbreaking experiment, resulting in later modifications on how the LAPD trained and qualified with handguns. During his time in SIS as both worker bee and field supervisor, Helms was the primary tactical firearms instructor, overseeing the development of arrest tactics and marksmanship techniques unique to the SIS. He had the same job in SWAT (tactical firearms instructor), and was instrumental in developing CQB and hostage rescue training for what many consider the finest (and oldest) SWAT unit in the US.

Lessons Learned

What I keyed on during my interviews with these four gentlemen were that the similar points and lessons stressed not only staying alive, but to win the gunfight. I don’t think there’s anything new here. What came across was applying marksmanship basics and training constantly works better than the latest gun or tactical technique. Detailed planning of your operation, training as a team and repetition of training wins firefights and street confrontations. For the citizen, meaningful practice, knowing the law, when and when not to engage and what you’ll do after the shooting are what’s important.

Training

Training is critical. Train hard and train often. Shoot as much as you can afford to, and shoot competitively. Even if it’s just shooting against your range partner, compete. Flawless performance under stress is what you’re after. Col. Charles Askins, who was no stranger to a gunfight, told me he experienced far more stress during the National Matches than in any gunfight. Competitive practice also gives you a yardstick to measure your performance by.

Work on the basics; sight alignment and trigger control have won more gunfights than point shooting at sinister-looking targets or a roadhouse spin. The basics of marksmanship, though boring, apply in all shooting scenarios. Practice the basics over and over. Advanced drills and tactics come later after you’ve learned to shoot. Excellent marksmanship skills build confidence.

Work out as much as you shoot. Lift weights, run, and be physical whenever you can. Being fit and strong will improve your marksmanship and give you the determination to fight and win. John Helms is a serious student of the martial arts. It’s another survival skill that complements his marksmanship training.

“Don’t have a preferred weapon. Learn to excel and win with whatever you have.” John emphasized this several times when I spoke with him. Be comfortable with whatever you bring to the fight; don’t fall into the “I must have my favorite 9mm or .45,” or whatever else you carry. The weapon is only a tool, whether it’s a pistol, shotgun or police baton. Be familiar with whatever you have available. Have a plan, train as a team and refine your training based on feedback from team members. Then train some more.

What happens if this is not addressed:

Competitors have a drive to win, or at least not come in last. That drive pushes them to practice and go to matches where they need to shoot with consistent accuracy and at a speed that at least keeps up with everyone else. Most military and police qualify only a few times (or once) each year on a fixed course that never asks them to do better than pass. I can dry practice every day and go to a match any given week if I want. My skills have gone through the roof since I started competing.

How will this get me killed?

Stress introduced into shooting causes interesting results. Being able to work through the stress of competitive pressure will always improve your shooting ability.

I have competed in a major international shooting competition where I saw and experienced different levels of stress. The funny thing about stress (aside from actual physical stress) is that it’s only in the mind.

What constitutes shooting? Lining up the sights and pulling the trigger. Nowhere in that equation does the word “stress” make an appearance. “I hope I don’t miss”, “I suck at steel”, “I hate qualification”, etc., are all statements that can incur stress but have nothing to do with shooting. Being able to turn off the mental stress (conscious mind) and replace it with subconscious skill comes only with repeated exposure to some kind of stress. You can practice by yourself for eternity, but you need a way to test it. The best way to do that without putting yourself at risk of harm is by participating in shooting competitions.

Another byproduct of both repeated practice and competitions is a higher ability to handle and manipulate your firearms, being able to draw, reload, and move without looking like Mr. Magoo (or Jar-Jar Binks if you were born after 1987).

One of the biggest things I observe a lot of LEOs have issues with when they either qualify or come to classes is their ability to have effective gun handling. Under normal, non-competitive circumstances, a draw should be under two seconds from either a retention holster or concealment. I’ve been witness to hundreds of qualifications and observed the draw habits of hundreds of officers, and the majority have a hard time meeting that metric.

Why? Isn’t being able to get the gun out of the holster an important function of the patrol officer? Once the officer initially learns how to draw the gun, it becomes an awkward exercise in straps, levers, and clothing. It’s hard to remember all the by-the-numbers steps that are necessary to have a smooth draw, so what happens is one of the following: Either the draw becomes a spastic pull and tug, yanking until the gun gets free, or it becomes ritualistically slow. Neither is a good result.

However, there is hope. Like any sport, repeated practice guarantees accomplished technique. But what forces someone to practice? I’ve known some pretty “tactical” people in my travels. They are dedicated people who practice their draws, go to the range, and work out like madmen. In their mind, they can’t fail. They do what they have to do to keep their edge. God bless them. I sleep better knowing they are out there. But what about the majority of the “tactical” community? Do you spend an hour a day working on firearm skills? How often do you go to the range? And, what do you do when you get there?

See, there is a definite way to push the skill level up. Wait for it... shoot competition. Better weapon manipulation is a byproduct of routine handling and shooting the gun. Not everyone wants to go out and win, but I’ve seen grandmothers and kids (truthful) with skills that put a lot of “tactical” folk to shame.

Please don’t take this as “competition is great, tactical is bad.” If it’s good enough for grandma, then maybe the tactical guys should try it.

Many of the techniques used in the tactical firearms community come directly from the competitive world. Competitive shooters are routinely hired to train the special operations community. If it’s good enough for CAG, DevGru, Tier 1, etc., well... maybe it’s good enough for you and me.

Arik Levy is an 12 year veteran law enforcement officer working full time at a major metropolitan agency in the South East. He spent 7 years working the streets in patrol and as a field training officer. For the past four years he has been a full time firearms instructor teaching handgun, rifle and shotgun. Arik also has been competing in USPSA for the past two years where he is currently classified in Production Division at A class. He is a two time gold medalist in his division for the Florida Police and Fire games 3 Gun match, and a gold medalist in both the Practical Pistol and Shotgun match. He is also the Top Cop Pistol Champion for 2014 and 2015. He has trained with an extensive list of both tactical and competitive instructors including: Mike Pannone, Pat McNamara, Frank Proctor, Scott Reitz, Chris Costa, Max Michel, Frank Garcia, Bruce Gray, Ben Stoeger, Steve Anderson and Jerry Barnhart. Arik is also a certified Advanced Armorer with Glock, Colt, Sig Sauer and Smith and Wesson.

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Abstract

Known Distance Rifle Marksmanship is a superior method for training and preparing soldiers for combat. It is cost-effective; easier to attain realistic training results with fewer resources; troops and can be internally unit-supported with minimal higher unit resourcing.

Known Distance (KD) produces more lethal soldiers who can quickly engage moving enemy at most likely engagement distances in limited visibility, in short exposures more effectively than against standard electronic targets. KD marksmanship is critical for preparing US soldiers in Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) by engaging enemy soldiers at the maximum effective range of their weapon systems. KD training provides soldiers individual and collective shooting experience in weapon manipulation, fire control, defining sectors of fire, and managing ammunition beyond static shooting scenarios. Soldiers develop shot management skills adjusting for wind and weather to engage enemies at different ranges and on the move simulating actual combat conditions.

KD ranges decrease dependence on powered targetry and civilian range staff, allowing units to execute training more autonomously. Additionally, it reduces the need for extensive specialized maintenance targetry, as basic KD lifters and uprights replace complex and expensive electronic or mechanical components. One multipurpose KD range complex can support various live courses of fire shooting and training at true distance, minimizing the need for scheduling multiple separate varied ranges and facilities with unique Surface Danger Zones (SDZ).

Argument for Known Distance Marksmanship Training - Refined Technique

Marksmanship improvement programs recommend stable firing positions, tighter shot groups, and target feedback. “Correction of Mistakes” includes snap-shooting, moving target engagement, and sustained fire techniques. The current Army marksmanship strategy focuses on Trainfire-style targets that only detect hits – but not whether or not a Soldier scores a lethal hit on the target. The idea that KD shooting does not produce shooters that are proficient in the snap shooting has logical fallacies linked to the Army’s lack of readiness post-WWII / pre-Korea (TRAINFIRE, 1958). BG SLA Marshall published “Men Against Fire,” a theoretical publication that had a major impact on the Army’s marksmanship practices, leading to the adoption of Trainfire. The primary issue with “Men Against Fire” is that the sources that cite the exact results and scientific claims recommending changes to the Army marksmanship program and combat preparation are not well-grounded in the actual science of combat. SLA Marshall was often found to have fabricated results and/or engagements that never occurred. This means that misleading assertions and “facts” are the foundation of the current Army marksmanship strategy.

Past arguments against moving target implementation have included limited National Guard and Army Reserve targetry infrastructure available to support moving target ranges (TRAINFIRE I, 1958). An Army Research Institute study that assessed the feasibility of moving target ranges in conjunction with Automated Record Fire ranges concluded that building or modifying the structure of current ARF ranges would be excessively cost-prohibitive [TRAINFIRE I, 38]. KD ranges require no additional technology or electronics to facilitate moving targets beyond 1” by 6’ pieces of plywood, cardboard targets, and personnel to physically move targets behind the target berm wall (the Pit). The execution of this training has no change to SDZ and is not restricted to a specific target type or distance.

The most critical piece of direct-fire engagement is moving targets. For years, 5 ton and 2.5-ton trucks have been effectively used to tow target sleds equipped with E-type target arrays during live fire. This method does not rely on electronics, allowing soldiers to practice their engagement techniques in a realistic environment. Recent examples of this training occurred during the Desert Phase of Ranger School, conducted at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah, White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, Fort Bliss, Texas, and at the Joint Readiness Training Center (Locke, 2005)

KD marksmanship produces competent shooters who can self-coach, assess, and solve problems with marksmanship systems. It provides subject matter expertise internal to units without outsourcing to contracting organizations. An example would be adjusting for wind and atmospheric conditions. A proficient KD shooter can self-coach without a spotter or assistant and diagnose errors to adjust his sights to engage targets successfully. Extreme edge shots on targets used on the ARF range may still count as hits, but lethal zones on the enemy which can result in a kill can be accurately determined with proper down-range feedback. The closer a round is to the center of the target, the smaller the error margin to avoid missing. The accuracy of the cone of dispersion produced by an AR-15 rifle with M855A1 ammunition is visualized below. Note: Test was executed with a free-floated non-standard rifle. AA53 DODIC 5.56mm ammunition (also known as mk 262 77gr match ammunition) is considered the best possible scenario of ammunition available to a standard M4A1 rifle in Army inventory (NCScout, 2017). Depicted below is the ideal dispersion of rounds at distance. Soldiers that can visualize and implement this concept of where the rounds are shot on target are able to be more proficient and lethal in combat. The closer a properly zeroed weapon is able to be fired at the center of a target the higher the probability a target will be hit. Mean dispersion measured was 2 MOA – 2 Inches at 100 Meters.

According to 43.6.7.3 of MIL–DTL–70599C, technical specifications of the M4 Carbine, the maximum allowable extreme spread accuracy requirement is 7 MOA at 100 Yards or 7 inches (Picatinny Arsenal, 2019) Endurance target and accuracy. This is an accuracy requirement that is drawn from a selection of 1000 randomly selected carbines in each shipment to the U.S. Army. Typically the accuracy standard of rejection for an M4A1 carbine is 6 MOA before it must be sent back to a depot or higher level of echelon support. This is the military standard which is actually less accurate than a civilian free-float accuracy standard. This further emphasizes the requirement to utilize proper marksmanship techniques as the shooter will be fighting the physical accuracy limitations of the weapon system.

The original intent of 25m validation exercises was to provide a progression into actual distance confirmation exercises. Automated Record Fire Ranges were intended to complement and enhance reduced distance marksmanship training and Known Distance marksmanship training - Not replace it [TRAINFIRE, 2]. Trainfire was intended to be an ecosystem of progressive training where soldiers built skill validation at 25m, progressed to KD marksmanship, then to moving and snap-shooting targets. The key advantage of KD is that it allows training flexibility separate from a restrictive range footprint where software restricts training scenarios.

Soldiers are also able to rapidly train individual and collective marksmanship and live-fire tasks together on one facility implementing a single range request, ammunition forecast, lane safety and range support in a single training plan without the need for additional facilities or support from a higher headquarters. Fundamentals of fire and maneuver are able to achieve more repetition and practice in individual, team and squad size elements ahead of collective live-fire tables where the unit will be formally assessed by OCTs (Observer Controller Trainers) ahead of Combat Training Center Rotations leading to improved performance.

Facilities to implement usage of new weapon system

Known Distance Rifle Ranges are a historic component of most U.S. Army installations. They have existed in one form or another to support the implementation of rifle and carbine firing using .30-06 rifle cartridges and SDZ from implementing the modern bolt-action military centerfire rifle. Although many facilities have converted to Modified Record Fire or Automated Record Fire Ranges, multiple facilities can support the most modern caliber 6.8 mm rifle cartridges. Short-range training ammunition or baffled ranges are methods that can be used to reduce SDZ width, length, and hazard (Department of the Army, 2014).

Facilities currently available in the Army inventory

Both commercial and military facilities are available to support a rapid build-up of US forces in the event of a Large-Scale Combat Conflict. These ranges provide an immediate solution for training in long-range engagements and shoot-and-move drills with moving targets. The Army currently has 89 ranges suitable for Known Distance Rifle shooting. Additionally, these ranges may accommodate an Exception to Policy (ETP), which would allow for typical SDZs that are normally too restrictive to be waived, thereby facilitating training.

The primary issue with electronic targets is the same issue that provides the advantage: electricity. Electronic targets require maintenance beyond standard hand tools, and the bulk of the Trainfire program relied on an electronically powered range to run complex tables of fire. Known Distance targetry does not require powered target lifters to present targets to the shooter. A pit detail can raise these targets via multiple different types of target frames varying from cantilever, pulley, or standing target frames. The targets are presented on a 6’ x 6’ Modular Target Panel constructed of cardboard or coroplast plastic. The Known Distance Target Lifter is depicted below:

LOMAH electronic systems have limitations regarding the software programs and adjustments that can be used. This restricts future advancements in marksmanship techniques as significant time is required to reprogram and field new software, followed by its implementation in updates or a completely new LOMAH system (Golden, 44-45).

Gates restrict LOMAH’s progression. Gates are pre-determined barriers within software where the accuracy threshold must be met with rounds inside a certain interval on the target in order to load the next training program for the shooter. Due to default programming that cannot be overridden, a shooter that happens to miss or does not successfully fire all rounds into the exact center of the silhouette cannot progress to the next stage of firing for zero confirmation until that entire stage is unlocked - regardless of ammunition type or several rounds remaining. A potential benefit of the LOMAH system is that it requires the same footprint as a standard ARF / MRF range. I recommend a combined approach to facilitate input. Most KD systems remain built on the same ARF footprints - but legacy target pits and lifters have become obscured by terrain or vegetation.

Easy fixes are walk-and-paste ranges for down-range feedback using unit-made target frames or those that can be rapidly produced by range control. The downsides include the time it takes to install the system and the time it takes to traverse the range to receive feedback and repair the targets. KD pits require minimal troop movement if manned in multiple relays, minimal to no electrical input, and can present feedback with no maneuver to the targets to repair or check results.

Commercial Shot Marker / Kongsberg-type electronic scoring systems provide immediate feedback to the firer, coach, and scorer. The new XM157 Optic is advertised and promoted as having the proper ammunition setting to provide a 90% firing solution that eliminates the need for down-range feedback. This is not the case. The down-range feedback issue during rifle marksmanship has been an issue since the beginning of Trainfire. The top recommendation in Army Research Institute studies is for increasing down-range feedback so that the soldier can progress and gain experience on exactly where his rounds are impacting and how to utilize this in combat.

The practical range restriction for Automated Record Fire (ARF) to include ARF+ for the Next Generation Squad Weapon System (NGSW) is that a target must be 90 percent visible from the firing position it will be engaged from. Range control must modify the targets to have the correct height to present a minimum 90% target profile (TC 25-8, 2021). Gaining units are frequently unaware to request this modification, or range control, even when requested does not perform this modification leading to targets presented being less than 90% visible to the firer. This leads to targets frequently being missed. This is avoided with KD targets as the target can be stapled or glued anywhere on the 6’ x 6’ Modular Target Panel (Backer).

The problem with computerized targetry is that each type of table or qualification requires a different ARF range based on the SDZ footprint (DA, 2014). All tables of marksmanship training can be executed using Known Distance Ranges. Electronic targetry is also affected by the debris kicked up from rounds impacting the berm. These obstruct the optical and audio sensors that detect rounds impacting or landing near the targets. KD has this issue to a certain extent but relies solely on the feel, sound, and sight of actual rounds impacting the backer and target. This removes machine and electronic reliance on sensors, which require constant maintenance to provide feedback. Targets can be lowered behind the target berm limiting a Soldier’s ability to engage until they are deliberately lifted for firing based on timed exposures.

A consistent argument against round targets recommends marksmanship training on E-Type targets only. The main argument is that round KD targets do not simulate the enemy at a distance well enough. Round KD targets are beneficial because they provide a mathematically symmetrical way to measure the dispersion of rounds a shooter produces during a course of fire and enable clean adjustments to acquire and refine a good zero. Zeroing is the most important process of the standard Table I-VI progression and is critical to qualification and combat. The standard 25m group and zero advocated across the board for the traditional Table IV in Integrated Weapon Training Strategy (IWTS) is only a mathematical approximation of where the rounds should be projected to impact. The KD zero was eliminated in successive Trainfire programs post-1958 because it was perceived that the mathematical approximation was sufficient to gain proper zero for targets at distance. The primary issue is just that – it’s an approximation of zero. The US Army is now on its third iteration of standardized 5.56mm ammunition (M193 to M855 and now M855A1).

Traditional target offsets for 25m are now inaccurate due to the difference in trajectory for each different ammunition type at true distance. One of KD range’s greatest strengths is its standardized true target distance, regardless of the range’s location on the planet. The requirement that the range maintains a certain slope factor and target array enables consistency of training separate from what an ARF range can provide.

Statistical Engagement Distances

Sources have typically characterized the combat distances encountered in the last 70 years of modern combat as 25-150m, 150m to 250m expanding to 400m and beyond up to 800m (Simon, 2018). This is deceptive, as combat engagement distances have varied depending on the biome and terrain encountered in fighting. Mountain warfare has different engagement distances than dense jungles, which vary from urban combat or temperate forests.

Historical attempts to add in the short 3-5 second rush that a standard enemy soldier would attempt to maneuver toward US positions have been met with the inability to adjust range size, lack of movement space, and budgetary constraints (Wilson, 1971). Instead of a fully automated range, a KD range with short lifters and movers can simulate these moving enemy soldiers at any distance unrestricted by targetry support.

Distances and ammunition expenditures differ from techniques of most likely urban combat engagement. Most current Army rifle and weapon qualifications revolve around short-distance engagements of urban distances but shot over rural terrain. Rural distances to engage the enemy have differed, and ammunition expenditures have typically been characterized by quick range engagements varying from 150 to 250m. Multiple round engagements have been driven by the proliferation of SAPI (Small Arms Protective Insert) plates among peer threats to the United States in proxy conflicts. Seldom does one round penetrate hard armor plates.

Conversion to Aiming Laser or Aiming Devices during limited visibility has increased the accuracy of aimed fire without using sights. This has led to targets engaged with greater accuracy at night.

The capability gap identified by modern or recent war US Army Company leader After Action Report feedback centers on engagement of enemy soldiers from 10-300m, an extended engagement between 300-500m, and ultra-long engagement between 600-800m, corresponding to current Army capabilities and limitations.

Most standard infantry engagements occur from 10-300m. Most Squad Designated Marksman engagements occur between 200-500m and are classified as Long-Range engagements.

Snipers are trained to engage at distances longer than typical SDM distances of up to normally 800m. Snipers are a company level asset. Traditionally the US Army fielded a Squad Designated Rifleman as one per squad to support the squad automatic rifleman or the combined platoon support-by-fire from World War Two, Korea, Vietnam and more recently OEF/OIF. Recent revisions to Army doctrine have removed the role of SDM from current squads, assuming that most infantry riflemen should be able to engage targets at the maximum effective range of the typical M4 rifle and beyond with the M240L machine gun.

Combat AARs from recent Afghanistan and Iraq wars detail that although the Army possesses the capability to engage targets out to maximum effective range, the training of personnel to do so rarely extends to 300m, if that. Most personnel are trained to engage only up to 200m, with 300m treated as a long-range engagement (Simon, 2018).

The US Army traditionally had the capability of the SDM retained in one form or another through WW2, Korea, Vietnam, and early GWOT (English, 1984). The 1942 MTOE PLT and squad diagram included two grenadiers, two automatic riflemen, two assistant gunners, two team leaders, a squad leader, and 3 riflemen. This 12-man infantry squad remained consistent through WW2, facilitating a more robust response to combat losses. The structure and responsibility of the SDM changed in 1943 from the bolt-action Springfield M1903A3 to the M1C and M1D. Post-WW2, the structure was reduced to 9 men instead of 12. The current assessment of the US Army squad structure lacks DOTMLPF-P analysis. It is driven more by the budgetary constraints of MTOE and seating in the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (BIFV) than by reorganizing the squad elements.

The BIFV has the same capacity of 7+2 as the M2 Half-Track Armored Car used in WW2 and Korea. The new XM30 retains the same capacity as the BIFV. According to MTOE, only a partial squad of 7 can ride in the BIFV. To structure a full 9-man squad would require splitting the squad into two separate vehicles for deployment. If a full-size fire team were to deploy with each BFV, doubling the size of platoons to 8 BFVs per. This would increase mechanical vehicle support, recovery assets, maintenance, and cost. The current Army structure supports partial manning throughout squads into each vehicle and is restricted and based more off budgetary constraints than manning and firepower constraints. Enemies of the United States in future conflicts may outnumber US forces 4 to 1 or, in some cases, 10 to 1, necessitating the lethality and marksmanship abilities of US Army squads to increase to compensate for the lack of numbers. This is why marksmanship and the ability to deliver rounds accurately must be sustained and increased. US forces will have fewer troops to commit to the fight than our adversaries.

Originally, Trainfire IV’s purpose was to dedicate training to the top 25% of qualification firers to facilitate a 2-week Squad Sniper (SDM) or formal Sniper School training to increase the lethality of US Infantry formations. (WYMAN, 1956)

Historical Techniques

Counterarguments for implementing Known Distance Techniques have frequently included that they are objectively more expensive in time and material than automated target systems (TRAINFIRE, 1956). Trainfire produces more qualified soldiers in less time than Known Distance Rifle Marksmanship statistically (TRAINFIRE, 1956). Known Distance Rifle Marksmanship produces better shooters and peer coaches that can sustain proficiency once qualified. This is a significant strategy in training that the Army abandoned post-Vietnam. The Army, under pressure to produce numbers, saw that most of the Marksmanship Training Units that served as Post, Division, and

Installation assets were disbanded as a waste of funds despite the incredible subject matter expertise and training that was able to be provided to units internally without outside contractors or technology relying on power or maintenance upkeep.

The initial strategy was to rapidly increase the number of qualified rifle marksmen for the event of large-scale conflict. General Wyman asserts that there would always need to be a cadre of experienced rifle marksmen and proficient squad-designated marksmen maintained at the unit level to maintain unit proficiency with small arms, which has rapidly reduced in the Army. Unfortunately, the Army has no formal system of training Squad Designated Marksman or trainers beyond the Master Marksmanship Training Center which has a capped capacity and requires qualifications that units are unwilling to train for or sustain due to perceived time and budgetary constraints.

Known Distance marksmanship and training units were seen as expensive and irrelevant, so most units deactivated their Marksmanship Training Units and Known Distance Rifle Ranges (Weiher, 1964). This caused a severe decrease in subject matter expertise at the company and platoon levels for US Army Divisions, which created a lack of trainers internal to these units who could facilitate quality training via subject matter expertise.

Small arms cause a part of the casualties in combat paired with field artillery, explosives, and accidents. In recent Large-Scale Conflicts, an average of 32.45% of all combat fatalities have been caused by small arms. The leading cause of casualties, 49.9% is by explosive projectile shells – artillery (Reister, 1973). Reister’s measurement of casualties and their type from WW2 and Korea is a close approximation of a war with a peer adversary. To an extent qualification is an extension or a simulation of being able to engage the enemy with small arms because it is a way to measure the ability to engage with a weapon in controlled environment limiting outside factors. Targets presented in a logical manner can be consistently scored, and individual and collective performance measured and compared. Simple technology is more efficient to efficiently train critical Soldier shooting skills Soldiers physically determine the outcome of wars.

After General Wyman retired, changes to KD marksmanship were rapidly implemented to focus on the fastest route to qualification, which was not necessarily the best or most suitable for the long sustainment of Army Marksmanship techniques (Weiher, 1960). The Army reformed its marksmanship program by dumping the old program instead of creating additions and modernizing it. The National Guard and

Reserve component have continued to modernize Army marksmanship competition. Targetry and courses of fire have retained Trainfire shoot and move concepts, moving targets, and snap shooting. Army National Guard and Reserve facilities continue to train and compete at Known Distances despite the Active Army’s primary reliance on ARF/MRF ranges.

There is a disconnect between subject matter experts at the ground level and the overall big picture on the feasibility of known distance marksmanship execution. Soldiers lack sufficient coaching, time, ammunition, or facilities to learn and sustain shooting skills (Crowley, 1-71). The fine line currently dividing doctrine and its execution is the perceived lack of time. If commanders and NCOs perceive that the system does not allocate sufficient time to train the required skill, they will cut corners not out of malice but out of ignorance.

The Army has traditionally looked for a technological solution (hardware) to a training solution (software) problem. Most software implemented follows a lifecycle of 2year delay due to the Army’s process of evaluation and funding approval from the DOD (Lofgren, 2022). The Army is reluctant to purchase new systems incorporating updates and/or revisions to a system bought on contract. Once a system is tested, evaluated, and adopted the Army avoids purchasing additional add-ons, regardless of the improvement value, because of initial contracting and fielding requirements. Contracts that specify updates or new components require testing and formal evaluation, which prevents the rapid improvement of the Army’s targetry systems.

Current Marksmanship Techniques

The Army’s principal marksmanship strategy of suppression over hits focuses on the engagement of single targets and single exposure, which the Army sought to implement in the latter stages of the Trainfire Program produced post-Korean War (TRAINFIRE, 1958). The problem with the current rifle qualification strategy that implements ARF / Train Fire is the soldier does not know where on the target he hit, only that he either hit or missed the target. If he missed – He has no idea where he missed in the silhouette or if the round was close at all. The Army chose to field the Trainfire program as a method to produce “shake and bake” riflemen to create qualified riflemen faster in greater quantity. The Army perceived that less experts, but more minimum qualified soldiers were worth the benefit of qualifying at a mediocre standard. To note: 57% score – 23 / 40 is required for a soldier to qualify. In any other setting outside of rifle qualification, an F-grade score would be unsatisfactory and required extensive re-training and remedial counseling. Army Reserve Officer Training Corps Basic Officer Leader Course – A (ROTC BOLC A) evaluated cadets on marksmanship as a graduation requirement. 6184 Cadets were evaluated. 4% shot “Expert”, 30% “Sharpshooter”, and 63% “Marksman. Qualifying scores for rifle marksmanship were broken down into minimum requirements of 23 hits for “Marksman”, 30 for “Sharpshooter”, and 36 hits for “Expert”. 3% failed to meet minimum qualification standards after multiple attempts. 105 Junior Cadets from Texas A&M Army ROTC achieved higher proficiency levels, 10% “Expert”, 47% “Sharpshooter”, and 43% “Marksman” (Roysdon, 2023). The success of the Texas A&M Army ROTC program can be attributed to extensive Known Distance marksmanship training in preparation for BOLC-A.

KD ranges change the HOW of producing soldiers confident with assault, working in fire teams and squads, gaining repeatable collective proficiency. It is not just technical – it’s low-level unit leadership -- command and control, consolidation, rates of fire, direct-fire engagement techniques, and reconsolidation. Commonality, control, and consistency doctrinally build data and proficiency using crawl, walk, and run methodology.

Recommended Advanced Rifle Qualification

I recommend that the Army restore Known Distance Rifle Ranges they already possess. These ranges retain the .30-06 and 7.62mm Safety Danger Zones used since WWI and support a wide range of legacy service ammunition more powerful than 5.56mm. Many of these Known Distance Rifle Ranges exist but are not maintained on current ARF / MRF footprints. We have facilities that can handle long-range engagement without relying on extensive electronic support and maintenance. Units like the National Guard and Reserve that drill on the weekends would not have to rely on civilian contracting support or targetry to maintain training throughout the week. No specific civilian support is required for specific software programming, targetry, or facility maintenance. All supplies can be handled by the unit or resources from Range Control and assembled with hand tools. With the Department of Defense already restricting funds to weekend support and using contractors on Days of No Scheduled Activity (DONSA) and holidays, training units could use ranges and resources they already own without outsourcing or delaying training.

Establishing, maintaining, and sustaining small arms training proficiency and expertise are critical to combat success. The Army National Guard and Reserve component are excellent examples of this. Known distance marksmanship training is a proven and successful training method and technique the institutional Army already owns on most of our own Active duty, National Guard, and Reserve posts, bases, land, and facilities. FM 3-21.8 (superseded by ATP 3-21.8), paragraph 1-45 states: “[W]hen collectively applied by the fire team, squad, and platoon, these skills translate into combat power.” (Lewis, 2016). This requires a high level of training and sustainment.

“I wish there was a way to transfer information to people in a way they could understand when it disagrees with their beliefs. I am when teaching, spending more and more time unlearning people from their discussion oriented opinions. Often what sounds good is not true. Or possible. Or easy.

“The truth is the techniques involved in shooting well are rather simple. Just very hard to do well. I find many who struggle to perform well believe it is due to lack of knowledge. Frequently, it is a lack of skill and/or talent. This is very hard to accept for some.

“The beauty of the Internet is the ease with which opinions can be presented. The weakness is that info may be wrong.

“Assume this: if something seems hard to do, then it probably is. Anything that requires great skill and talent to do well is probably hard. Those that do difficult things well usually work at it, in real time, not in theory or discussion. Shooting is one of those types of things.

“I enjoy a good discussion as well as anyone, but the truths I have discovered from all these years of training and testing lead me to believe that skill is more easily developed on the range than on the keyboard. Funny as I am typing this now...

“I have found I am often not able to get the results with a technique I had hoped for. The technique is often not at fault. Many times I am not good enough at a technique to make it work. That then takes you down another road...

“This rant was motivated by a post by someone who chose to comment with a very traditional yet incorrect view on a subject often misunderstood. I get that we all like to put our two cents worth in, but saying blue is green because everyone you know says blue is green does not turn blue into green.”

There’s no formal process for quantifying injuries, hospitalizations, or even deaths caused by therapeutic drug use, which excludes overdose or misuse.

“Risk management begins with measuring things accurately, so you know what the threats are and the ones where you should be paying attention,” says Thomas J. Moore, senior scientist for drug safety and policy at the Institute for Safe Medication Practices. But he notes that there’s no system in place or accepted methodology for developing these tallies for prescription drugs, unlike with overdoses.

Estimates dating back nearly two decades put the number at 100,000 or more deaths annually, which includes a study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association in 1998 that projected 106,000 deaths per year. A more recent analysis estimates 128,000 Americans die each year as a result of taking medications as prescribed, or nearly five times the number of people killed by overdosing on prescription painkillers and heroin.

It’s worth noting that over 60 percent of people in the United States take at least one prescribed drug.

“By far the greatest number of [prescription drug-related] hospitalizations and deaths occur from drugs that are prescribed properly by physicians and taken as directed,” says Donald Light, a medical and economic sociologist, professor of comparative health policy at Rowan University School of Osteopathic Medicine in Stratford, New Jersey. Light was also the lead author of Institutional Corruption of Pharmaceuticals and the Myth of Safe and Effective Drugs, a 2013 paper that detailed the estimate. “About 2,460 people per week are estimated to die from drugs that were properly prescribed, and that’s based on detailed chart reviews of hospitalized patients,” says Light. The estimate, which didn’t include those who died as a result of prescribing errors, overdose, and self-medication, would make taking properly prescribed drugs the fourth leading cause of death in the U.S.

Would you be surprised to learn that pharmaceutical companies spend the most lobby money, outspending the second and third place lobbyists combined?

Also, pro-gun lobbying is a tiny fraction by comparison. See the tick mark at the very bottom of this chart:

Prescription drugs can provide myriad benefits, and any side effects are usually minor. Most people using prescription drugs judiciously benefit from the. Still, adverse drug reactions are estimated to result in 1.5 to 2.5 million hospitalizations each year. And though following a doctor's orders and medication labeling instructions can reduce harms associated with taking prescription drugs, simply taking prescribed drugs as directed can expose a person to risk.

“Most people who are harmed by prescription drugs [are] taking the drug as prescribed,” says Dr. Michael Carome, director of the Health Research Group at the consumer watchdog Public Citizen. Even the best projections of medication-related death and injury are likely underestimates of the harm inflicted, he says, since often these adverse events may be errantly attributed to another cause, like a patient's underlying condition.

But while complexities present challenges to pinpointing the number, Carome says population growth and aging are likely to increase further injuries and deaths resulting from taking prescription medications. “As people get older, they tend to have more illnesses, and they end up taking more prescriptions,” he says, which can increase the chances that drugs will interact dangerously. In addition, kidney and liver function can decline with age, making it harder to metabolize drugs, thus increasing the risk of side effects.

Even a single drug taken in isolation has the potential to cause harm. There’s no such thing as a risk-free drug.

Meanwhile, a popular narrative remains fixated on statistically rare events: