Modern Infantry Marksmanship Solutions

Known Distance Rifle Marksmanship: An Infantry Commander's Solution to Modern Marksmanship Training

The following report was written by Capt. Victor Liwanag, Infantry.

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Abstract

Known Distance Rifle Marksmanship is a superior method for training and preparing soldiers for combat. It is cost-effective; easier to attain realistic training results with fewer resources; troops and can be internally unit-supported with minimal higher unit resourcing.

Known Distance (KD) produces more lethal soldiers who can quickly engage moving enemy at most likely engagement distances in limited visibility, in short exposures more effectively than against standard electronic targets. KD marksmanship is critical for preparing US soldiers in Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) by engaging enemy soldiers at the maximum effective range of their weapon systems. KD training provides soldiers individual and collective shooting experience in weapon manipulation, fire control, defining sectors of fire, and managing ammunition beyond static shooting scenarios. Soldiers develop shot management skills adjusting for wind and weather to engage enemies at different ranges and on the move simulating actual combat conditions.

KD ranges decrease dependence on powered targetry and civilian range staff, allowing units to execute training more autonomously. Additionally, it reduces the need for extensive specialized maintenance targetry, as basic KD lifters and uprights replace complex and expensive electronic or mechanical components. One multipurpose KD range complex can support various live courses of fire shooting and training at true distance, minimizing the need for scheduling multiple separate varied ranges and facilities with unique Surface Danger Zones (SDZ).

Argument for Known Distance Marksmanship Training - Refined Technique

Marksmanship improvement programs recommend stable firing positions, tighter shot groups, and target feedback. “Correction of Mistakes” includes snap-shooting, moving target engagement, and sustained fire techniques. The current Army marksmanship strategy focuses on Trainfire-style targets that only detect hits – but not whether or not a Soldier scores a lethal hit on the target. The idea that KD shooting does not produce shooters that are proficient in the snap shooting has logical fallacies linked to the Army’s lack of readiness post-WWII / pre-Korea (TRAINFIRE, 1958). BG SLA Marshall published “Men Against Fire,” a theoretical publication that had a major impact on the Army’s marksmanship practices, leading to the adoption of Trainfire. The primary issue with “Men Against Fire” is that the sources that cite the exact results and scientific claims recommending changes to the Army marksmanship program and combat preparation are not well-grounded in the actual science of combat. SLA Marshall was often found to have fabricated results and/or engagements that never occurred. This means that misleading assertions and “facts” are the foundation of the current Army marksmanship strategy.

Past arguments against moving target implementation have included limited National Guard and Army Reserve targetry infrastructure available to support moving target ranges (TRAINFIRE I, 1958). An Army Research Institute study that assessed the feasibility of moving target ranges in conjunction with Automated Record Fire ranges concluded that building or modifying the structure of current ARF ranges would be excessively cost-prohibitive [TRAINFIRE I, 38]. KD ranges require no additional technology or electronics to facilitate moving targets beyond 1” by 6’ pieces of plywood, cardboard targets, and personnel to physically move targets behind the target berm wall (the Pit). The execution of this training has no change to SDZ and is not restricted to a specific target type or distance.

The most critical piece of direct-fire engagement is moving targets. For years, 5 ton and 2.5-ton trucks have been effectively used to tow target sleds equipped with E-type target arrays during live fire. This method does not rely on electronics, allowing soldiers to practice their engagement techniques in a realistic environment. Recent examples of this training occurred during the Desert Phase of Ranger School, conducted at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah, White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, Fort Bliss, Texas, and at the Joint Readiness Training Center (Locke, 2005)

KD marksmanship produces competent shooters who can self-coach, assess, and solve problems with marksmanship systems. It provides subject matter expertise internal to units without outsourcing to contracting organizations. An example would be adjusting for wind and atmospheric conditions. A proficient KD shooter can self-coach without a spotter or assistant and diagnose errors to adjust his sights to engage targets successfully. Extreme edge shots on targets used on the ARF range may still count as hits, but lethal zones on the enemy which can result in a kill can be accurately determined with proper down-range feedback. The closer a round is to the center of the target, the smaller the error margin to avoid missing. The accuracy of the cone of dispersion produced by an AR-15 rifle with M855A1 ammunition is visualized below. Note: Test was executed with a free-floated non-standard rifle. AA53 DODIC 5.56mm ammunition (also known as mk 262 77gr match ammunition) is considered the best possible scenario of ammunition available to a standard M4A1 rifle in Army inventory (NCScout, 2017). Depicted below is the ideal dispersion of rounds at distance. Soldiers that can visualize and implement this concept of where the rounds are shot on target are able to be more proficient and lethal in combat. The closer a properly zeroed weapon is able to be fired at the center of a target the higher the probability a target will be hit. Mean dispersion measured was 2 MOA – 2 Inches at 100 Meters.

According to 43.6.7.3 of MIL–DTL–70599C, technical specifications of the M4 Carbine, the maximum allowable extreme spread accuracy requirement is 7 MOA at 100 Yards or 7 inches (Picatinny Arsenal, 2019) Endurance target and accuracy. This is an accuracy requirement that is drawn from a selection of 1000 randomly selected carbines in each shipment to the U.S. Army. Typically the accuracy standard of rejection for an M4A1 carbine is 6 MOA before it must be sent back to a depot or higher level of echelon support. This is the military standard which is actually less accurate than a civilian free-float accuracy standard. This further emphasizes the requirement to utilize proper marksmanship techniques as the shooter will be fighting the physical accuracy limitations of the weapon system.

The original intent of 25m validation exercises was to provide a progression into actual distance confirmation exercises. Automated Record Fire Ranges were intended to complement and enhance reduced distance marksmanship training and Known Distance marksmanship training - Not replace it [TRAINFIRE, 2]. Trainfire was intended to be an ecosystem of progressive training where soldiers built skill validation at 25m, progressed to KD marksmanship, then to moving and snap-shooting targets. The key advantage of KD is that it allows training flexibility separate from a restrictive range footprint where software restricts training scenarios.

Soldiers are also able to rapidly train individual and collective marksmanship and live-fire tasks together on one facility implementing a single range request, ammunition forecast, lane safety and range support in a single training plan without the need for additional facilities or support from a higher headquarters. Fundamentals of fire and maneuver are able to achieve more repetition and practice in individual, team and squad size elements ahead of collective live-fire tables where the unit will be formally assessed by OCTs (Observer Controller Trainers) ahead of Combat Training Center Rotations leading to improved performance.

Facilities to implement usage of new weapon system

Known Distance Rifle Ranges are a historic component of most U.S. Army installations. They have existed in one form or another to support the implementation of rifle and carbine firing using .30-06 rifle cartridges and SDZ from implementing the modern bolt-action military centerfire rifle. Although many facilities have converted to Modified Record Fire or Automated Record Fire Ranges, multiple facilities can support the most modern caliber 6.8 mm rifle cartridges. Short-range training ammunition or baffled ranges are methods that can be used to reduce SDZ width, length, and hazard (Department of the Army, 2014).

Facilities currently available in the Army inventory

Both commercial and military facilities are available to support a rapid build-up of US forces in the event of a Large-Scale Combat Conflict. These ranges provide an immediate solution for training in long-range engagements and shoot-and-move drills with moving targets. The Army currently has 89 ranges suitable for Known Distance Rifle shooting. Additionally, these ranges may accommodate an Exception to Policy (ETP), which would allow for typical SDZs that are normally too restrictive to be waived, thereby facilitating training.

The primary issue with electronic targets is the same issue that provides the advantage: electricity. Electronic targets require maintenance beyond standard hand tools, and the bulk of the Trainfire program relied on an electronically powered range to run complex tables of fire. Known Distance targetry does not require powered target lifters to present targets to the shooter. A pit detail can raise these targets via multiple different types of target frames varying from cantilever, pulley, or standing target frames. The targets are presented on a 6’ x 6’ Modular Target Panel constructed of cardboard or coroplast plastic. The Known Distance Target Lifter is depicted below:

LOMAH electronic systems have limitations regarding the software programs and adjustments that can be used. This restricts future advancements in marksmanship techniques as significant time is required to reprogram and field new software, followed by its implementation in updates or a completely new LOMAH system (Golden, 44-45).

Gates restrict LOMAH’s progression. Gates are pre-determined barriers within software where the accuracy threshold must be met with rounds inside a certain interval on the target in order to load the next training program for the shooter. Due to default programming that cannot be overridden, a shooter that happens to miss or does not successfully fire all rounds into the exact center of the silhouette cannot progress to the next stage of firing for zero confirmation until that entire stage is unlocked - regardless of ammunition type or several rounds remaining. A potential benefit of the LOMAH system is that it requires the same footprint as a standard ARF / MRF range. I recommend a combined approach to facilitate input. Most KD systems remain built on the same ARF footprints - but legacy target pits and lifters have become obscured by terrain or vegetation.

Easy fixes are walk-and-paste ranges for down-range feedback using unit-made target frames or those that can be rapidly produced by range control. The downsides include the time it takes to install the system and the time it takes to traverse the range to receive feedback and repair the targets. KD pits require minimal troop movement if manned in multiple relays, minimal to no electrical input, and can present feedback with no maneuver to the targets to repair or check results.

Commercial Shot Marker / Kongsberg-type electronic scoring systems provide immediate feedback to the firer, coach, and scorer. The new XM157 Optic is advertised and promoted as having the proper ammunition setting to provide a 90% firing solution that eliminates the need for down-range feedback. This is not the case. The down-range feedback issue during rifle marksmanship has been an issue since the beginning of Trainfire. The top recommendation in Army Research Institute studies is for increasing down-range feedback so that the soldier can progress and gain experience on exactly where his rounds are impacting and how to utilize this in combat.

The practical range restriction for Automated Record Fire (ARF) to include ARF+ for the Next Generation Squad Weapon System (NGSW) is that a target must be 90 percent visible from the firing position it will be engaged from. Range control must modify the targets to have the correct height to present a minimum 90% target profile (TC 25-8, 2021). Gaining units are frequently unaware to request this modification, or range control, even when requested does not perform this modification leading to targets presented being less than 90% visible to the firer. This leads to targets frequently being missed. This is avoided with KD targets as the target can be stapled or glued anywhere on the 6’ x 6’ Modular Target Panel (Backer).

The problem with computerized targetry is that each type of table or qualification requires a different ARF range based on the SDZ footprint (DA, 2014). All tables of marksmanship training can be executed using Known Distance Ranges. Electronic targetry is also affected by the debris kicked up from rounds impacting the berm. These obstruct the optical and audio sensors that detect rounds impacting or landing near the targets. KD has this issue to a certain extent but relies solely on the feel, sound, and sight of actual rounds impacting the backer and target. This removes machine and electronic reliance on sensors, which require constant maintenance to provide feedback. Targets can be lowered behind the target berm limiting a Soldier’s ability to engage until they are deliberately lifted for firing based on timed exposures.

A consistent argument against round targets recommends marksmanship training on E-Type targets only. The main argument is that round KD targets do not simulate the enemy at a distance well enough. Round KD targets are beneficial because they provide a mathematically symmetrical way to measure the dispersion of rounds a shooter produces during a course of fire and enable clean adjustments to acquire and refine a good zero. Zeroing is the most important process of the standard Table I-VI progression and is critical to qualification and combat. The standard 25m group and zero advocated across the board for the traditional Table IV in Integrated Weapon Training Strategy (IWTS) is only a mathematical approximation of where the rounds should be projected to impact. The KD zero was eliminated in successive Trainfire programs post-1958 because it was perceived that the mathematical approximation was sufficient to gain proper zero for targets at distance. The primary issue is just that – it’s an approximation of zero. The US Army is now on its third iteration of standardized 5.56mm ammunition (M193 to M855 and now M855A1).

Traditional target offsets for 25m are now inaccurate due to the difference in trajectory for each different ammunition type at true distance. One of KD range’s greatest strengths is its standardized true target distance, regardless of the range’s location on the planet. The requirement that the range maintains a certain slope factor and target array enables consistency of training separate from what an ARF range can provide.

Statistical Engagement Distances

Sources have typically characterized the combat distances encountered in the last 70 years of modern combat as 25-150m, 150m to 250m expanding to 400m and beyond up to 800m (Simon, 2018). This is deceptive, as combat engagement distances have varied depending on the biome and terrain encountered in fighting. Mountain warfare has different engagement distances than dense jungles, which vary from urban combat or temperate forests.

Historical attempts to add in the short 3-5 second rush that a standard enemy soldier would attempt to maneuver toward US positions have been met with the inability to adjust range size, lack of movement space, and budgetary constraints (Wilson, 1971). Instead of a fully automated range, a KD range with short lifters and movers can simulate these moving enemy soldiers at any distance unrestricted by targetry support.

Distances and ammunition expenditures differ from techniques of most likely urban combat engagement. Most current Army rifle and weapon qualifications revolve around short-distance engagements of urban distances but shot over rural terrain. Rural distances to engage the enemy have differed, and ammunition expenditures have typically been characterized by quick range engagements varying from 150 to 250m. Multiple round engagements have been driven by the proliferation of SAPI (Small Arms Protective Insert) plates among peer threats to the United States in proxy conflicts. Seldom does one round penetrate hard armor plates.

Conversion to Aiming Laser or Aiming Devices during limited visibility has increased the accuracy of aimed fire without using sights. This has led to targets engaged with greater accuracy at night.

The capability gap identified by modern or recent war US Army Company leader After Action Report feedback centers on engagement of enemy soldiers from 10-300m, an extended engagement between 300-500m, and ultra-long engagement between 600-800m, corresponding to current Army capabilities and limitations.

Most standard infantry engagements occur from 10-300m. Most Squad Designated Marksman engagements occur between 200-500m and are classified as Long-Range engagements.

Snipers are trained to engage at distances longer than typical SDM distances of up to normally 800m. Snipers are a company level asset. Traditionally the US Army fielded a Squad Designated Rifleman as one per squad to support the squad automatic rifleman or the combined platoon support-by-fire from World War Two, Korea, Vietnam and more recently OEF/OIF. Recent revisions to Army doctrine have removed the role of SDM from current squads, assuming that most infantry riflemen should be able to engage targets at the maximum effective range of the typical M4 rifle and beyond with the M240L machine gun.

Combat AARs from recent Afghanistan and Iraq wars detail that although the Army possesses the capability to engage targets out to maximum effective range, the training of personnel to do so rarely extends to 300m, if that. Most personnel are trained to engage only up to 200m, with 300m treated as a long-range engagement (Simon, 2018).

The US Army traditionally had the capability of the SDM retained in one form or another through WW2, Korea, Vietnam, and early GWOT (English, 1984). The 1942 MTOE PLT and squad diagram included two grenadiers, two automatic riflemen, two assistant gunners, two team leaders, a squad leader, and 3 riflemen. This 12-man infantry squad remained consistent through WW2, facilitating a more robust response to combat losses. The structure and responsibility of the SDM changed in 1943 from the bolt-action Springfield M1903A3 to the M1C and M1D. Post-WW2, the structure was reduced to 9 men instead of 12. The current assessment of the US Army squad structure lacks DOTMLPF-P analysis. It is driven more by the budgetary constraints of MTOE and seating in the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (BIFV) than by reorganizing the squad elements.

The BIFV has the same capacity of 7+2 as the M2 Half-Track Armored Car used in WW2 and Korea. The new XM30 retains the same capacity as the BIFV. According to MTOE, only a partial squad of 7 can ride in the BIFV. To structure a full 9-man squad would require splitting the squad into two separate vehicles for deployment. If a full-size fire team were to deploy with each BFV, doubling the size of platoons to 8 BFVs per. This would increase mechanical vehicle support, recovery assets, maintenance, and cost. The current Army structure supports partial manning throughout squads into each vehicle and is restricted and based more off budgetary constraints than manning and firepower constraints. Enemies of the United States in future conflicts may outnumber US forces 4 to 1 or, in some cases, 10 to 1, necessitating the lethality and marksmanship abilities of US Army squads to increase to compensate for the lack of numbers. This is why marksmanship and the ability to deliver rounds accurately must be sustained and increased. US forces will have fewer troops to commit to the fight than our adversaries.

Originally, Trainfire IV’s purpose was to dedicate training to the top 25% of qualification firers to facilitate a 2-week Squad Sniper (SDM) or formal Sniper School training to increase the lethality of US Infantry formations. (WYMAN, 1956)

Historical Techniques

Counterarguments for implementing Known Distance Techniques have frequently included that they are objectively more expensive in time and material than automated target systems (TRAINFIRE, 1956). Trainfire produces more qualified soldiers in less time than Known Distance Rifle Marksmanship statistically (TRAINFIRE, 1956). Known Distance Rifle Marksmanship produces better shooters and peer coaches that can sustain proficiency once qualified. This is a significant strategy in training that the Army abandoned post-Vietnam. The Army, under pressure to produce numbers, saw that most of the Marksmanship Training Units that served as Post, Division, and

Installation assets were disbanded as a waste of funds despite the incredible subject matter expertise and training that was able to be provided to units internally without outside contractors or technology relying on power or maintenance upkeep.

The initial strategy was to rapidly increase the number of qualified rifle marksmen for the event of large-scale conflict. General Wyman asserts that there would always need to be a cadre of experienced rifle marksmen and proficient squad-designated marksmen maintained at the unit level to maintain unit proficiency with small arms, which has rapidly reduced in the Army. Unfortunately, the Army has no formal system of training Squad Designated Marksman or trainers beyond the Master Marksmanship Training Center which has a capped capacity and requires qualifications that units are unwilling to train for or sustain due to perceived time and budgetary constraints.

Known Distance marksmanship and training units were seen as expensive and irrelevant, so most units deactivated their Marksmanship Training Units and Known Distance Rifle Ranges (Weiher, 1964). This caused a severe decrease in subject matter expertise at the company and platoon levels for US Army Divisions, which created a lack of trainers internal to these units who could facilitate quality training via subject matter expertise.

Small arms cause a part of the casualties in combat paired with field artillery, explosives, and accidents. In recent Large-Scale Conflicts, an average of 32.45% of all combat fatalities have been caused by small arms. The leading cause of casualties, 49.9% is by explosive projectile shells – artillery (Reister, 1973). Reister’s measurement of casualties and their type from WW2 and Korea is a close approximation of a war with a peer adversary. To an extent qualification is an extension or a simulation of being able to engage the enemy with small arms because it is a way to measure the ability to engage with a weapon in controlled environment limiting outside factors. Targets presented in a logical manner can be consistently scored, and individual and collective performance measured and compared. Simple technology is more efficient to efficiently train critical Soldier shooting skills Soldiers physically determine the outcome of wars.

After General Wyman retired, changes to KD marksmanship were rapidly implemented to focus on the fastest route to qualification, which was not necessarily the best or most suitable for the long sustainment of Army Marksmanship techniques (Weiher, 1960). The Army reformed its marksmanship program by dumping the old program instead of creating additions and modernizing it. The National Guard and

Reserve component have continued to modernize Army marksmanship competition. Targetry and courses of fire have retained Trainfire shoot and move concepts, moving targets, and snap shooting. Army National Guard and Reserve facilities continue to train and compete at Known Distances despite the Active Army’s primary reliance on ARF/MRF ranges.

There is a disconnect between subject matter experts at the ground level and the overall big picture on the feasibility of known distance marksmanship execution. Soldiers lack sufficient coaching, time, ammunition, or facilities to learn and sustain shooting skills (Crowley, 1-71). The fine line currently dividing doctrine and its execution is the perceived lack of time. If commanders and NCOs perceive that the system does not allocate sufficient time to train the required skill, they will cut corners not out of malice but out of ignorance.

The Army has traditionally looked for a technological solution (hardware) to a training solution (software) problem. Most software implemented follows a lifecycle of 2year delay due to the Army’s process of evaluation and funding approval from the DOD (Lofgren, 2022). The Army is reluctant to purchase new systems incorporating updates and/or revisions to a system bought on contract. Once a system is tested, evaluated, and adopted the Army avoids purchasing additional add-ons, regardless of the improvement value, because of initial contracting and fielding requirements. Contracts that specify updates or new components require testing and formal evaluation, which prevents the rapid improvement of the Army’s targetry systems.

Current Marksmanship Techniques

The Army’s principal marksmanship strategy of suppression over hits focuses on the engagement of single targets and single exposure, which the Army sought to implement in the latter stages of the Trainfire Program produced post-Korean War (TRAINFIRE, 1958). The problem with the current rifle qualification strategy that implements ARF / Train Fire is the soldier does not know where on the target he hit, only that he either hit or missed the target. If he missed – He has no idea where he missed in the silhouette or if the round was close at all. The Army chose to field the Trainfire program as a method to produce “shake and bake” riflemen to create qualified riflemen faster in greater quantity. The Army perceived that less experts, but more minimum qualified soldiers were worth the benefit of qualifying at a mediocre standard. To note: 57% score – 23 / 40 is required for a soldier to qualify. In any other setting outside of rifle qualification, an F-grade score would be unsatisfactory and required extensive re-training and remedial counseling. Army Reserve Officer Training Corps Basic Officer Leader Course – A (ROTC BOLC A) evaluated cadets on marksmanship as a graduation requirement. 6184 Cadets were evaluated. 4% shot “Expert”, 30% “Sharpshooter”, and 63% “Marksman. Qualifying scores for rifle marksmanship were broken down into minimum requirements of 23 hits for “Marksman”, 30 for “Sharpshooter”, and 36 hits for “Expert”. 3% failed to meet minimum qualification standards after multiple attempts. 105 Junior Cadets from Texas A&M Army ROTC achieved higher proficiency levels, 10% “Expert”, 47% “Sharpshooter”, and 43% “Marksman” (Roysdon, 2023). The success of the Texas A&M Army ROTC program can be attributed to extensive Known Distance marksmanship training in preparation for BOLC-A.

KD ranges change the HOW of producing soldiers confident with assault, working in fire teams and squads, gaining repeatable collective proficiency. It is not just technical – it’s low-level unit leadership -- command and control, consolidation, rates of fire, direct-fire engagement techniques, and reconsolidation. Commonality, control, and consistency doctrinally build data and proficiency using crawl, walk, and run methodology.

Recommended Advanced Rifle Qualification

I recommend that the Army restore Known Distance Rifle Ranges they already possess. These ranges retain the .30-06 and 7.62mm Safety Danger Zones used since WWI and support a wide range of legacy service ammunition more powerful than 5.56mm. Many of these Known Distance Rifle Ranges exist but are not maintained on current ARF / MRF footprints. We have facilities that can handle long-range engagement without relying on extensive electronic support and maintenance. Units like the National Guard and Reserve that drill on the weekends would not have to rely on civilian contracting support or targetry to maintain training throughout the week. No specific civilian support is required for specific software programming, targetry, or facility maintenance. All supplies can be handled by the unit or resources from Range Control and assembled with hand tools. With the Department of Defense already restricting funds to weekend support and using contractors on Days of No Scheduled Activity (DONSA) and holidays, training units could use ranges and resources they already own without outsourcing or delaying training.

Establishing, maintaining, and sustaining small arms training proficiency and expertise are critical to combat success. The Army National Guard and Reserve component are excellent examples of this. Known distance marksmanship training is a proven and successful training method and technique the institutional Army already owns on most of our own Active duty, National Guard, and Reserve posts, bases, land, and facilities. FM 3-21.8 (superseded by ATP 3-21.8), paragraph 1-45 states: “[W]hen collectively applied by the fire team, squad, and platoon, these skills translate into combat power.” (Lewis, 2016). This requires a high level of training and sustainment.