Here’s the problem as I see it. The primary role of the NCO is training Soldiers, yet NCOs in general are lacking. This isn’t their fault because one can’t effectively teach what one was never taught. I didn’t get to attend MMTC [Marksmanship Master Trainer Course] before retiring and it was still a pilot then, but 200 NCOs a year doesn’t get the Army healthy [especially when this course is never required to conduct a range].
Drill Sergeants come from all over the Army. They get marksmanship in DS school, but at what level and from whom? How much time out of those few weeks is dedicated to learning things never previously learned in any formal training environment before coaching and diagnosing problem shooters, or is it just the bare basics? I say this because a vast number in the formation never got any formal instruction in weapons employment after BCT and much of the stuff floating around is “I learned this from my buddy in Group or Regiment” while not giving context and/or getting it wrong.
This leads to what we see here. It won’t get fixed until the Army takes small arms training seriously and quits collectively lying with green blocks on Command and Staff slides and then never progressing beyond baseline skills for qual.
- Mike Lewis
Really, we can tell.
The Army adopted the Trainfire model around 1955. The most recent version revamped the program in the late 1970s and served as the primary approach (often, the only approach) until the new Training Circulars re-wrote doctrine starting in 2016.
Until the new TCs and qualifications for them, all changes to U.S. Army small arms standards over the past seven decades or so have reduced the challenge and needed skill. The Marine Corps has followed a similar trend. Further, despite making the qualification standards easier and less challenging over the years and the improvements to weapons and sight, average scores still continue to decline. Every published source I’ve encountered (see) indicates average qual scores have been declining for the past half-century. When the Department of Army revised Trainfire in the late 1970s, they conducted a series of tests to establish a baseline of scores on the then-new qual. This qual was revised in the mid-2000s which made the course even easier to pass.
82nd Airborne Division G-3 conducted an internal assessment (Enduring Range Report FY2017) which is especially relevant because it was just as the qual was being changed starting in 2016. Despite using optics and shooting an easier course, their average score was lower than the testing in 1979. Two brigades had an average score lower than the minimum to pass. Warrant officers and field grade officers had the highest average scores, junior officers (1LT and 2LT) had a better average than the senior NCOs, and junior enlisted had the lowest average, but no group managed to surpass the 1979 average scores.
The equipment is better than ever, particularly with data from armorers showing current optics are more robust than iron sights and battery life measured in many months of continuous use. It ain’t the guns…
This data is public domain and if I can find it, so can senior leadership. They’re willfully ignorant, just don’t care, or both.
Consider these videos where Soldiers conducting routine qualification during Basic are advancing downrange with loaded rifles and expected to take up positions on timed pop-up targets.
FM 23-71 and then 23-8, which were doctrine when these films were made, conducted a qualification with two record courses each containing four tables of fire that included shooting while advancing, offhand, and other unsupported shooting. There was also regular use of peer coaching. This was supposed to be the norm until the late 1970s when this was reduced in favor of a much simplified single record course with two tables, all fired from prone. By the mid-2000s this was reduced even further by adding a third table fired from kneeling with the shooting done at half distance and with even more generous time limits.
Despite having statistics to confirm that all these changes continually made the qualification even easier, Army records show qualification rates have still steadily declined. Average first-attempt qualification scores for active duty Soldiers are barely at or below the minimum passing score required; reserve component Soldiers are even worse with the average first-attempt scores consistently below the minimum needed to pass and typically 2/3 of a unit’s personnel unable to pass on their first attempt without assistance. This standard has always been intended to be easy enough to be passed by new shooters with no prior experience and a few days of instruction and practice and the Army collectively still can’t do it.
But don’t let that stop leadership from continuing to attempt to buy a fix.
Giving soldiers a shiny new weapon system is pointless if we don’t address one of the Army’s most persistent and glaring faults: its marksmanship program sucks. There’s no one part of the thing we can point to as being problematic. It’s not just the BRM taught at Basic, or the qualification tables. The whole thing, from start to finish, really, really, sucks.
What’s the point of giving soldiers a shiny, new rifle if they can’t hit the broadside of a barn with the one they’ve got?
Now, before you break out the pitchforks and your “Expert” qualification badges (which can be earned at a low level of skill and fail to denote actual expertise), sit down and think about what I’m saying. Unless your MOS directly involves shooting things in the face, when was the last time you went to the range during the workday for something other than qualification? When was the last time you broke out the rifles for anything other than to qualify or to clean them for inspection?
For most of you, that answer will be either the last time you deployed, or never. And that’s a huge problem.
Over the last ten-and-a-half years in the North Carolina Army National Guard, I’ve spent more time being told not to kill myself or rape people than how to shoot. I don’t have a problem with qualification myself; I can reliably shoot high sharpshooter to low expert. But I also make a point to shoot recreationally whenever I can. Not everyone has that option, and plenty of folks who do don’t take advantage of it.
For most folks, the entirety of their marksmanship training will consist of three weeks in Basic, the few days out of the year when they go qualify, and maybe a few days or even a week of extra training when they mobilize. And that simply isn’t enough.
Nevermind that the Army’s qualification system is stupid and outdated. Shooting static popup targets at ranges between 50-300 meters is a good start, but to rely on that as the sole measure of a soldier’s ability to engage the enemy is insane. According to the Army Times, one of the driving forces behind looking for a new round is the fact that something like half of all firefights occurred at ranges greater than 300 meters. Meanwhile, your average soldier doesn’t even bother shooting at the 300 meter targets because they know they can’t hit the damn things.
If the Army’s quest for a new sidearm is any indication, the search for a new rifle will take at least a decade, untold millions of dollars, a half-dozen Congressional inquiries and investigations, and probably a few lawsuits before they settle on the final product. Which means there’s plenty of time to teach soldiers how to shoot before the new gear ever starts filtering its way through the system.
As a starting point, come up with a comprehensive training plan that utilizes Basic Rifle Marksmanship, then build on that foundation throughout the soldier’s career. Get soldiers to the range more often. Update the qualification tables to more accurately represent the threat they’re expected to face. Enforce qualification standards like PT standards, and offer regular remedial training for folks who fail to meet those standards.
Or just carry on before and put a shiny new rifle in the hands of a kid who barely knows which end goes bang. I watched a guy from our battalion’s Forward Support Company shoot a 6 out of 40 this year during qualification. That’s good enough, right?
- “Analysis: The Army has a range problem, but it’s not because of the 5.56 round”, Havok Journal
Hit the nail in the head. An infantry company today needs a platoon of clerks and data entry specialist to provide all of the useless shit to higher. The Army should have learned a lesson from the Kosovo train up, training for peacekeeping task makes it harder to get ready if a war stumbles in. Love to see the data on WHY NCOs can’t get it done. My theory is too much focus on Human Resources stuff and not enough on killing!